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INTRODUCTION

On June 29, 2001, just outside Klamath Falls, Oregon, an angry mob of farmers took
actions into their own hands. Massing around the closed floodgates of a federally operated
irrigation ditch, the crowd defied federal government orders, burst open the floodgate locks, and
returned the flow of water to the thirsty soils of their croplands.1 The mob stayed put and made
camp for the next few days, challenging federal officials time after time by unlocking the gates as
soon as they had been closed. The crowd finally was dispersed under the stern direction of
United States Marshals. The battle lines could not have been more clearly drawn. The farmers
cried for relief from dry irrigation ditches and the specter of failed crops. The federal government
stood firm. The gates had to stay shut and farmlands go dry in order to save endangered fish
dependent on the stored waters. The following March, however, amidst the flash of news
cameras and photo opportunities, the Secretary of Agriculture and Secretary of the Interior quite
publicly opened the very same floodgates. What made the first liberation of water an act of civil
disobedience and the latter a high-profile case of wise federal governance? Improbably, the
answer came from a room full of scientists and a practice called peer review.
This saga, popularly known as “the Klamath,” made headlines around the nation and
served as a rallying call for many communities in the Western United States concerned over the
future in the face of “their water” being dedicated to endangered species protection.2 The
standoff had been building ever since two local species of sucker fish and a population of coho
salmon below the dam had been listed for protection under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
This placed the fish under the watchful protection of the federal government.3 When the
government declared that the fish could no longer tolerate the release of water from the lake for
irrigation,4 angry farmers around the Klamath took charge., catapulting the conflict into “Exhibit
Number One” for critics of the ESA and their charge that agencies work on the basis of so-called
“junk science.”5 As closely as the popular press followed both these developments, however, it
completely missed the other consequence of the Klamath story, one that we believe has proven
far more significant—the rise of regulatory peer review.

1

For an account of the events described in this paragraph, see Ted Williams, Salmon Stakes, 105 AUDUBON
42 (March 2003), available at http://magazine.audubon.org/incite/incite0303.html.
2
See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note __, at 333–34 (connecting the desire for easier economic
development with more stringent scientific support for endangered species protection).
3
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is responsible for the suckers, and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for the salmon. For a description of the regulatory and
other authorities FWS and NOAA administer under the ESA, see infra notes __ - __ and accompanying
text.
4
Specifically, according to FWS and NOAA, further releases would have violated the ESA’s provision that
each federal agency “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species.” 16 U.S.C. §
1536.
5
See McGarvey & Marshall, supra note __, at 79-80. The Klamath Committee also was the target of much
criticism, including from scientists hired by different interest groups involved in the battle for water, and
the situation soon deteriorated into what some observers referred to as “combat biology.” Robert F.
Service, Combat Biology on the Klamath, 300 SCI. 36, 36 (2003). The lack of established structure for
carrying out the peer review probably contributed to the ways in which the findings were used and
abused—one reason for our proposal infra.
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The collision of two important but conflicting federal regulatory policies—providing a
secure supply of irrigation water to Western farmers versus providing the same water to
endangered fish in Western lakes and rivers—led to stalemate, and the federal government turned
to peer review to break the tie. Following the public outcry over the “fish-versus-humans”
decision and the standoff between farmers and federal officials at the floodgates, the National
Research Council (NRC), an arm of the National Academy of Science, was requested to convene
a committee of experts, known as the Klamath Committee, to conduct a peer review of the
agencies’ decisions—the first ever conducted of an agency decision of this magnitude under the
ESA.6 The initial results of the Klamath Committee’s peer review sparked a firestorm of
controversy.7 Reviewing the information available to the agencies at the time of their respective
decisions, the experts concluded that “no sound scientific basis” existed for the agencies’
conclusions. 8 The conclusions that further reducing lake levels would jeopardize the suckers and
that reducing river flows would harm the salmon, the peer review group stated, could not be
justified based on the available data. Releasing irrigation waters might harm the endangered fish,
or it might not – the science was too uncertain to say. Simply put, the agencies said that the
science got them from point A to point B, but the Klamath Committee concluded it did not. Soon
after, the floodgates were dramatically re-opened.
After the Klamath Committee issued its opinion, many observers began to ask whether
peer review should guide decisions in other regulatory settings. Indeed, since the Klamath
controversy, strong, insistent calls for improving agency decisions based on science have been
heard from the White House9 and throughout Congress.10 This self-proclaimed “sound science”

6

J.B. Ruhl was a member of the National Research Council’s Committee on Endangered and Threatened
Fishes in the Klamath River Basin (Klamath Committee). The Klamath Committee provided a report
thoroughly studying the area’s land use and water management history. See NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN: CAUSES OF DECLINE
AND STRATEGIES FOR RECOVERY 46-94 (2004) [hereinafter KLAMATH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT]. The
Klamath Committee also provided detail in an interim report. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF BIOLOGICAL OPINIONS ON ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE
KLAMATH RIVER BASIN—INTERIM REPORT (2002) [hereinafter KLAMATH COMMITTEE INTERIM REPORT].
Additional background and analysis of the events surrounding the Klamath can be found in Daniel J.
McGarvey & Brett Marshall, Making Sense of Scientists and “Sound Science”: Truth and Consequences
for Endangered Species in the Klamath Basin and Beyond, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 73 (2005); Marcilynn A.
Burke, Klamath Farmers and Cappuccino Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the Endangered Species Act and Why
it (Still) Matters, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 441 (2004); Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish,
Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath River Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279 (2003); Julia
Muedeking, Taking the Heart of the Klamath Basin: Is It Free?, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 217 (2003); Cori S.
Parobek, Of Farmers’ Takes and Fishes’ Takings: Fifth Amendment Compensation Claims When the
Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights Collide, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177 (2003); Reed D.
Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Basin Water and the Endangered Species
Act, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197 (2002).
7
See KLAMATH COMMITTEE INTERIM REPORT, supra note __.
8
Id. at 3–4 (finding no scientific evidence supporting requirement of increased lake levels or increased
stream flow).
9
The Bush Administration has aggressively advanced this agenda through means such as prescribing
standards for agency data quality control. See, e.g., Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality,
Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452
(Feb. 22, 2002); see generally Summary of Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request Prepared by EPA, 34 Env’t
Rep. (BNA) S-112 to S-121 (2003) (reproducing EPA’s February 3, 2003 summary of its proposed budget
including “Goal 8,” which the agency described as “Sound Science, Improved Understanding of
Environmental Risk and Greater Innovation to Address Environmental Problems”).
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movement argues that procedural safeguards to ensure better use of scientific data will improve
agency decisions, making them more rational and efficient.11 Ensuring the proper basis for
agency decisions has, of course, been a concern of administrative procedures since the New
Deal.12 But the focus of administrative law for agencies’ use of science has been the prevention
of abusive practices, such as suppression or manipulation of data, not the quality of the data,
itself. The focus of interested parties has been to expose these practice and that of judges to halt
them when they amount to arbitrary and capricious actions or an abuse of discretion.13 The sound
science movement seeks more than the traditional protections afforded by these conventions of
administrative law. Its claim is that agencies will use better science when they are required to
employ the scientific method as their decisionmaking protocol.14 More specifically, just as peer
review is one of the principal components of the scientific method, it has become one of the
principal demands of the “sound science” agenda.15
Scientific peer review is generally described as a rigorous review and critique of a study’s
methods, results, and findings that is conducted by others in the relevant field who have the
requisite training and expertise, who have no pecuniary or other disqualifying bias with respect to

10

Legislative proposals routinely use the “sound science” label to gain support. See, e.g., Sound Science
for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2003, H.R. 1662, 108th Cong. (2003); Sound Science for
Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2002, H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. (2d Sess.) (2002).
11
See David E. Adelman, Scientific Activism and Restraint: The Interplay of Statistics, Judgment, and
Procedure in Environmental Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497, 498 (2004) (“[S]chisms exist over how
science is used in setting environmental policy. For most critics of environmental regulation, broad
reliance on science is viewed as progress towards increased rationality and objectivity.”). A
comprehensive overview of the sound science debate is found at Thomas O. McGarity, Our Science is
Sound Science and Their Science is Junk Science, 52 KAN. L. REV. 897 (2004). A more entertaining,
though studiously documented account is available in CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE
(2005) [hereinafter MOONEY, REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE]. The discussion and debate regarding the use
of “sound science” in environmental law is pervasive—we found over 9300 web sites through a Google
search of “‘sound science’ AND ‘environmental law.’” For a historical perspective on the use of science in
environmental law, referencing a wealth of literature on the topic and suggesting several “cautionary tales”
about the promotion of using more “good science,” see Oliver Houck, Tales from a Troubled Marriage:
Science and Law in Environmental Policy, 302 SCI. 1926 (2003). Professor Wendy Wagner has produced
the most extensive body of work examining the claim for using more and better science in environmental
law. See Wendy E. Wagner, The ‘Bad Science’ Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over the Role of Science in
Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2003) [herinafter Bad
Science]; Wendy Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 181 (1999);
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995)
[hereinafter Science Charade].
12
See JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS & AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT (1978); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667 (1975). For a more recent discussion, see David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State
and its Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OREGON L. REV. 1 (2005).
13
For a more complete description of administrative law protections against agency misuse of science, see
infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
14
For an example of how demanding that agencies employ the scientific method would affect agency
decisions, see J.B. Ruhl, The Battle Over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555 (2004).
15
See MOONEY, REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE, supra note __, at 116-19. A counter-movement also has
emerged. For example, a group of legal scholars openly skeptical of its motives has formed to, among
other things, monitor and challenge initiatives of the “sound science” movement such as proposals for
requiring agencies to subject their proposed decisions to regulatory peer review. See Center for Progressive
Regulation, http://www.progressiveregulation.org/index.html (last visited ____).
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the topic, and who are independent of the persons who performed the study.16 Peer review is
commonplace, indeed, fundamental, to the practice of science.17 It is the gold standard for
determining publication and general acceptance of scientific research.
Just as scientific peer review involves independent evaluation of scientific research,
regulatory peer review refers to the outside evaluation of an administrative agency’s search,
selection, or use of scientific data to support a proposed regulatory decision such as a rule,
standard, permit, or other policy.18 Like scientific peer review, the review and critique would be
conducted prior to the agency’s final decision by qualified, independent experts who have no
pecuniary or other conflict of interest in the outcome of the agency’s decision. If peer review
works for science, goes the argument, it should work for agency decisions that purport to rely on
science, as well.
This seemingly straightforward logic has not, however, met with easy acceptance. The
growing debate over agency use of sound science and of regulatory peer review, in particular, has
become increasingly polarized, with strong claims made on both sides. To Congressman Greg
Walden (R-Or.), for example, the case for peer review is obvious.
If you went to a doctor and he said to you, “we are going to have to cut off your right leg,” you’d
probably want a second opinion. Right now under the Endangered Species Act, plants, animals
and people don’t have the chance to seek a second opinion; you just get cut off at the knees. 19

By contrast, the nongovernmental organization, Public Citizen, contends that mandating the
uniform use of peer review by federal agencies would:
favor regulated industry and introduce potentially massive costs and delay, thus injecting paralysis
by analysis into the regulatory process. . . . It is no overstatement that strict application of
[regulatory peer review] would bring many ordinary functions to a grinding halt, including the
16

NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PEER REVIEW IN ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
2 (1998), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309063388/html/index.html. A peer is “a person having
technical expertise in the subject matter to be reviewed (or a subset of the subject matter to be reviewed) to
a degree at least equivalent to that needed for the original work.” Id. at 28. The peer’s independence from
the work being reviewed “means that the peer, a) was not involved as a participant, supervisor, technical
reviewer, or advisor in the work being reviewed, and b) to the extent practical, has sufficient freedom from
funding considerations to assure the work is impartially reviewed.” Id.
17
For a discussion of the use and perception of peer review in science, see infra notes _-_ and
accompanying text.
18
Some critiques of the use of peer review in regulatory contexts address practices that we do not consider
within the scope of regulatory peer review. For example, Wendy Wagner argues against allowing members
of the public to petition an agency to make corrections to data the agency disseminates on the ground that
such a process “places interested parties in the role of peer reviewer.” See Wagner, Bad Science, supra
note __, at 69. She uses this procedure, and her claim that it is a form of peer review, as the basis for her
critique of using peer review in administrative law in general. See id. at 72-84. Regardless of how one
feels about such data-correction petition procedures, however, they are not peer review processes, as they
lack the independence of reviewer that is essential to properly conducted peer review. We critique poorly
designed proposals for regulatory peer review in Part VII infra, but we do not believe one can condemn
regulatory peer review in general simply because politicians or agencies have advanced poorly designed
proposals, or by suggesting that other procedural requirements fit within the scope of regulatory peer
review when they do not.
19
Walden Testifies on Need for Endangered Species Act Reform (Feb. 2004) (testimony of rep. Greg
Walden
(R-Or),
bill
sponsor
of
HR.
1662),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/or02_Walden/pr_040205_esa.html.
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government’s obligation to present public health, environmental and other information on a timely
basis.20

The increasing temperature of this debate reflects action heating up in Washington, as
well. A series of bills requiring regulatory peer review has been proposed in Congress,21 and the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has finalized peer review requirements for
“information products” regulatory agencies use in classes of regulatory decisions likely to have
significant economic or other impacts.22 That regulatory peer review has moved so quickly from
the newspapers to the Federal Register signals the potentially significant ramifications it could
have. Regulatory peer review is being added to the administrative law toolbox, and it is
important to understand what this means for agency practice in the future.
To make sense of the competing claims over regulatory peer review, three fundamental
questions need to be answered: The first is how many Klamaths are there? Regulatory peer
review can be justified only if many agency policy decisions that should be based at least in part
on science actually have no or insufficient scientific basis. Increased use of peer review will
undeniably impose costs on agencies, and unless there is first a firm sense of how often agencies
reach decisions without sufficient scientific support, we may end up overreacting – using a
sledgehammer to crack an acorn. Second, even if the Klamath experience is widespread – even if
agencies frequently fail to adequately justify policy decisions on scientific grounds – are these
actually poor policy decisions? The Klamath Committee, it is worth noting, never condemned
the federal government’s decision to close the floodgates, acknowledging that the decision may or
may not have been justified on policy grounds.23 It just was not justified on scientific grounds
alone.24 If the policy decision is on target, does it really matter that it was not justified by the
available data, or does the lack of a firm scientific basis inherently call into question the risk of
policy failure? Finally, even if there necessarily is cause for concern when agencies explicitly
base their policy decisions on inadequate scientific foundations, does regulatory peer review
provide an effective safeguard? Put differently, if instances such as the Klamath do pose a
significant risk of policy failure, is regulatory peer review the answer? Will it avoid more
Klamaths in the future?
Despite the raucous public debate over regulatory peer review, none of these questions
has been adequately addressed in scholarly literature, much less by the folksy wisdom and
Chicken Little cries of the various interest group combatants. Most legal scholarship on the issue
has opposed the use of regulatory peer review but, as useful and insightful as some of this work
has proven to be, we believe the issue is far from put to rest.25 No study has ever demonstrated
20

Public Citizen letter to Office of Management and Budget, Dec. 15, 2003, available at
http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/peer/Public_Citizen_PR_Comments.pdf
21
See, e.g., Sound Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of 2003, H.R. 1662, 108th Cong.
(2003). The ESA bills are discussed in more detail infra at notes __-__ and accompanying text.
22
See Office of Management and Budget, Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg.
2664 (Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter OMB Final Bulletin]. OMB’s policy unfolded through several iterations.
See Office of Management and Budget, Proposed Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality, 68
Fed. Reg. 54023 (Sept. 15, 2003) [hereinafter OMB Proposed Bulletin]; Office of Management and
Budget, revised Information Quality Bulletin on Peer Review, 69 Fed. Reg. 23230 (Apr. 28, 2004)
[hereinafter OMB Revised Bulletin]. The history and details of OMB’s policy are discussed infra at notes
__-__ and accompanying text.
23
See infra note __ and accompanying text.
24
See KLAMATH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note __, at 35.
25
For a general discussion of the role of peer review in regulatory law, see Lars Noah, Scientific
‘Republicanism’: Expert Peer Review and the Quest for Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033,
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whether use of regulatory peer review would have detected other instances like the Klamath,
whether the benefits of detecting those instances would have justified the costs of the peer review
programs, or whether it would have even mattered from the standpoint of reaching sound policy
decisions.26 This Article addresses these questions directly, grounding the debate over the use of
regulatory peer review in agency decisionmaking and providing a productive route forward.
Part II of the Article describes scientific peer review and its practical application in
journal publication, grant awards, and agency settings, illustrating the distinction between those
applications and regulatory peer review. The obvious difference between the use of peer review
in scientific research settings rather than agency regulatory settings is that science does not
purport to involve normative policy decisions, whereas regulation explicitly does. This section
thus explores how peer review would operate that different context. The next two sections of the
Article address the current debate over regulatory peer review, setting out the arguments in favor
of its use in Part III and their critiques in Part IV. Ironically, claims pro and con about regulatory
peer review rely on very few data points—any rigorous peer review of their merits would fault
them for this. In order to provide an empirical basis for our evaluation, therefore, we conducted a
nationwide survey of environmental lawyers to reveal the perceptions of practitioners whose
clients are or would be affected by regulatory peer review. As reported infra, we found a
remarkably intense divergence of opinion between private and public sector attorneys over the
prevalence of poor use of science by regulatory agencies, the need for regulatory peer review in
response, and its likely effectiveness. Generally, representatives of industry and also,
increasingly, of environmental groups believe agencies frequently base policy decisions on
inadequate scientific foundations, whereas agency representatives defend their performance. The
debate fueled in the White House and Congress, in other words, is not merely political rhetoric. It
reflects a sharp, deep division of opinion among the front line practitioners of administrative law
who have the experience to evaluate the prospects of regulatory peer review. Put simply,
regulatory peer review has become a polarizing and deeply felt issue.
In Part V of the Article we step back from the intensity of the debate to re-assess the role
of peer review in the regulatory process, suggesting a different way to think about its potential
costs, benefits, and appropriate applications. Contrary to most scholarship on the topic, we argue
that the unavoidable confluence of science and policy that agencies confront does not pose an
1045 (2000). The Klamath saga prompted several scholars to examine the use of peer review in the context
of endangered species protection. See McGarvey & Marshall, supra note __, at 107-11; Burke, supra note
__, at 506-14. Holly Doremus and J.B. Ruhl have each more broadly discussed the merits of using peer
review in connection with administration of the Endangered Species Act. See Holly Doremus, The
Purposes, Effects, and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL.
L. 397 (2004); J.B. Ruhl, Prescribing the Right Dose of Peer Review for the Endangered Species Act, 83
NEB. L.. REV. 398 (2004). Wendy Wagner has critiqued proposals for regulatory peer review in the broader
context of environmental law in general. See Wagner, Bad Science, supra note __, at 67-84; Wagner,
Science Charade, supra note __, at 1700. OMB’s peer review policy, which extends to a wide range of
regulatory agencies, has also been the subject of scholarly analysis. See Sarah Grimmer, Public
Controversy Over Peer review, 57 ADMIN. L. 275 (2005); Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious Peer Review
Procedures, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10064 (2004).
26
Although Wendy Wagner asserts “there are surprisingly few examples” of poor use of science by
agencies, she excludes from the claim “the larger universe of regulatory decisions involving the grant of
permits and licenses.” See Wagner, Bad Science, supra note __, at 72-73. Ironically, her basis for
excluding what amounts to the bulk of administrative regulation is that “these decisions rest in large part on
unvalidated industry science,” id. at 73, which, if true, would in our view make the case for applying
regulatory peer review to them even stronger. It is, of course, this “larger universe” of regulatory decisions
that is fueling proposals for more use of regulatory peer review, and which is thus the focus of this Article.
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insurmountable barrier to effective use of regulatory peer review. Rather, regulatory peer review
can help inform the public about where an agency’s use of science ends in support for a proposed
decision and where the agency’s use of professional judgment and normative policy choices
begins. The standard argument that agencies must make policy decisions in the face of
incomplete and uncertain scientific data, and thus should not be bound to the rigors of peer
review, turns the issue on its head. Designed wisely, regulatory peer review can help reveal how
much scientific uncertainty underlies an agency decision and can thus demand that the agency
explain how the gap was filled. This function, we argue, can lead to greater transparency in
agency decision processes and greater legitimacy of agency decisions with the public,
legislatures, and the courts.
Finally, in Part VI of the Article we move the debate forward by evaluating different
proposals currently under consideration for the design of regulatory peer review and propose a
way to take advantage of what peer review has to offer without imposing undue demands on
agency resources. Regulatory peer review is a hot topic at the moment, with agencies moving to
implement OMB’s recently promulgated policy and Congress proposing yet more peer review
requirements. These proposals, however, are either over-inclusive, as in proposals in Congress to
subject all ESA decisions to regulatory peer review, or under-inclusive, as in OMB’s policy
limiting peer review to decisions of extreme economic or other impact. The problem in each case
is that, while there is good reason to believe that regulatory peer review can serve salutary
purposes in administrative law, the scope of the problem is not competently addressed. There is
no evidence that all agency decisions suffer from the Klamath syndrome, or that only the “big”
ones are suspect.
Ironically, the scope of the problem cannot be assessed meaningfully without peer
review. Without conducting regulatory peer review, in other words, one cannot reasonably
conclude whether agencies ought to be required to conduct regulatory peer review because no one
knows how big a problem agency use of science is. To a scientist this dilemma has an easy
solution—the practice of random sampling. At present, there is no institutional structure in place
for systematically reviewing the scientific basis of regulatory decisions—i.e., for evaluating
whether an agency’s claim that science gets it from Point A to point B has a legitimate basis.
Hence, in order to assist policymakers in assessing the problem of agencies’ reliance on science
in regulatory decisions, if there is one, we propose the use of mandatory, “randomized peer
review” by agencies. A small number of decisions in particular categories of agency actions
would be routinely subjected to peer review in order to determine whether more frequent or
widespread application of peer review for that class of actions or for the agency as a whole is
justified. This diagnostic, adaptive approach has not been considered to date and, we argue,
delivers the greatest benefits of regulatory peer review while minimizing the costs.
II.

WHAT IS PEER REVIEW AND WHERE IS IT USED?

The underlying premise for regulatory peer review boils down to “what’s good for science is
good for regulation that relies on science.” This is an attractive phrase, but it compares apples
and oranges. Promulgating a regulation for exposure to carcinogens, it goes without saying, is
not the same thing as finding the cure for cancer. Using science, in other words, is not the same
thing as doing science. In order to assess whether the practice of peer review makes sense in
regulatory settings, then, we must first understand clearly the use and benefits of peer review in
science and how transferable these are.
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Conventional Applications of Scientific Peer Review27

Peer review is most strongly associated with scientific journal publication decisions, in
which it has been in use for over 300 years, but it is also employed in a wide array of settings,
including grant-funding decisions and faculty evaluations.28 Within science, peer review is
widely considered “essential to the integrity of scientific and scholarly communication.”29
Indeed, for many scientists, peer review “does not merely reflect the scientific method, it is the
scientific method.”30
When peer review is used in the context of journal publication and grant-award decisions,
the journal or granting institution acts as a “middleman” to find independent reviewers with
relevant expertise who will review the science, not the scientists, and the merits of publication.
The journal review process has been summarized as follows:
An aspiring author sends a manuscript to a journal’s editorial office. The journal editor,
or for large journals one of the associate editors, logs in the manuscript, selects two or
three reviewers to evaluate the manuscript, and sends each a copy. Reviewers are asked
to assess the manuscript and make a recommendation to accept, accept with revisions, or
reject the manuscript. The editor or associate editors then decide if they will accept the
recommendation of the reviewers.31

Grant-funding peer review follows a similar process.32 In both cases, the procedures seek
to ensure “a documented, critical review performed by peers who are independent of the work
27

This discussion of the use and perception of peer review in science also appears in substantially the same
form in Ruhl, supra note __, at 407-09.
28
See ANN C. WELLER, EDITORIAL PEER REVIEW: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 1–7 (2001).
29
Id. at 322.
30
Noah, supra note __, at 1045.
31
WELLER, supra note __, at 1. See ALSO FYTTON ROWLAND, THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS: A REPORT TO
THE
JISC
SCHOLARLY
COMMUNICATIONS
GROUP
1
(2002),
available
at
http://www.jisc.ac.uk/uploaded_documents/rowland.pdf. (JISC is the Joint Information Systems
Committee, the UK’s higher education support agency). When a submitted report first arrives at the
editorial office of a journal, it is first vetted by the editor, who may reject it out of hand—either because it
is "out of scope" (not dealing with the right subject matter for that journal) or because it is manifestly of
such low quality that it cannot be considered at all. Papers that pass this first hurdle are then sent to experts
in the field of the paper—usually two—who are generally asked to classify the paper as publishable
immediately, publishable with amendments and improvements, or not publishable.
32
For example, the National Science Foundation advises persons submitting grant proposals as follows:
Proposals received by the NSF Proposal Processing Unit are assigned to the appropriate NSF
program for acknowledgement and, if they meet NSF requirements, for review. All proposals are
carefully reviewed by a scientist, engineer, or educator serving as an NSF Program Officer, and
usually by three to ten other persons outside NSF who are experts in the particular fields
represented by the proposal. Proposers are invited to suggest names of persons they believe are
especially well qualified to review the proposal and/or persons they would prefer not review the
proposal. These suggestions may serve as one source in the reviewer selection process at the
Program Officer's discretion. Program Officers may obtain comments from assembled review
panels or from site visits before recommending final action on proposals. Senior NSF staff further
review recommendations for awards.
National Science Foundation, NSF Proposal Processing and Review, available at
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2003/nsf03041/3.htm (last visited April 5, 2004). Variations exist with respect to
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being reviewed.”33 The quality of the reviewers is central to any peer review. Ideally, one selects
reviewers who have demonstrated relevant expertise, independence, and freedom from conflicts
of interest.34
Substantively, the peer review process is not a “de novo” review, to borrow from a legal
model, but rather more like appellate review. The journal Ecology, for example, advises its
reviewers that their comments should address ten factors: (1) importance and interest to this
journal's readers; (2) scientific soundness; (3) originality; (4) degree to which conclusions are
supported; (5) organization and clarity; (6) cohesiveness of argument; (7) length relative to
information content; (8) whether material should be moved to the digital appendices; (9)
conciseness and writing style; and (10) appropriateness for the targeted journal and specific
section of the journal.35 Yet even when a peer reviewer employs all of these criteria, the intensity
of journal and grant peer review is nothing like de novo review. There is no independent research
to verify whether the data are accurate. Ecology explains, for example, that in assessing
“scientific soundness” the reviewer should examine the methods, data presentation, and statistical
design of the paper, but the instructions do not include engaging in independent data
authentication.36 Indeed, peer review would grind itself and journal publication to a screeching
halt were it to require peer reviewers to engage in independent testing and data analysis.
For those submissions deemed worth pursuing, the suggested changes by the reviewers
will generally be forwarded to the authors (with the reviewers’ names usually deleted), who then
revise their proposals accordingly. While not nearly as probing as a de novo analysis, it is widely
believed that this “appellate style” peer review provides tremendous benefits.37 First, peer review
serves as a filter, ensuring quality control. Knowing their articles will be evaluated by peers,
submitting authors have a strong incentive to ensure their conclusions are supported by the data.
Second, peer review prioritizes, allowing editors and grant makers to rank articles and proposals.
In the face of more articles and grant proposals submitted than can be published or funded, peer
review provides an effective means of winnowing the competition.

whether the journal or grant institution uses reviewers from a standing board or selects reviewers from a list
compiled by recommendations. See WELLER, supra note __, at 2.
33
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PEER REVIEW IN ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS 2 (1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309063388/html/. A peer is “‘a person
having technical expertise in the subject matter to be reviewed (or a subset of the subject matter to be
reviewed) to a degree at least equivalent to that needed for the original work.’” Id. The peer’s
independence from the work being reviewed “means that the peer, a) was not involved as a participant,
supervisor, technical reviewer, or advisor in the work being reviewed, and b) to the extent practical, has
sufficient freedom from funding considerations to assure the work is impartially reviewed.” Id.
34
WELLER, supra note __, at 207. Of course, even reviewers who meet these criteria may have personal
biases about approaches to or disputes in the particular scientific discipline under study, and there is no
objective way of de-biasing review panels from this effect. This is considered more troublesome to the use
of peer review in the social sciences. See Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of
Research Results, 49 AM. REV. PSYCHOL. 259, 277 (1998).
35
ESA Publications, Instructions for Reviewers, http://www.esapubs.org/esapubs/reviewers.htm (last
visited April 4, 2004). These criteria are representative of the scientific journal industry in general. See
WELLER, supra note __, at 160–63.
36
See id. As Holly Doremus has explained, “[p]eer reviewers are not expected to authenticate the data
presented to them. Rather, their role is to evaluate the methods employed and the facial plausibility of the
conclusions drawn.” Doremus, Listing Decisions, supra note __, at 1147.
37
There is some empirical evidence in support of this belief. See WELLER, supra note __, at 51-53.
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While less widespread than in scientific publications or grant making, peer review is also
employed by a number of federal agencies that have primarily science-based missions. A 1999
study by the Government Accounting Office (GAO), for example, found widespread peer review
employed primarily by science agencies such as NASA and the National Institutes of Health.38
Peer review was used for many purposes, ranging from grant awards and pre-publication review
of research to budget review and program- and employee-evaluation.39 These procedures were ad
hoc, with no uniform definitions or procedures, and ranged from outside mail reviewers and
workshops to internal and external standing panels.
B.

Extending Peer Review to Regulation

The use of peer review is far more limited and variable in agencies with regulatory
responsibilities. There is a strong tradition of expert advisory panels advising agencies on
specific topics, ranging from the Environmental Protection Agency’s Science Advisory Boards
and the Food and Drug Administration’s Technical Advisory Committees.40 These standing
panels, however, tend to focus more on how the agency should set priorities or think about
particular topical areas than on specific regulatory decisions.
Peer review is used much less frequently for regulatory decisions such as standard
setting, and almost never in permitting and licensing. One reason for this, presumably, is that
discrete regulatory decisions are where policy meets the real world, and thus peer review would
involve an assessment of how an agency used available scientific data in reaching a particular
application of policy rather than a scientific decision about whether a research hypothesis is
confirmed by data.
Using peer review in a regulatory context would thus require adapting conventional
scientific peer review in three respects. First, it will often be the case that the agency is not
actually doing the science that produces the data upon which it relies for its decision, but rather
uses data already available through other scientific research efforts. Thus, regulatory peer review
will need to address how the agency incorporated pre-existing scientific knowledge into its own
decision processes. Second, it will not always be the case that the data upon which the agency
relies are the result of peer-reviewed studies.41 Regulatory peer review, therefore, will need to
provide some assessment of those studies in the form of an evaluation of the agency’s choices
over which data to use. Finally, many regulatory decisions are not simply extensions of the
scientific method—i.e., they involve using science to inform, but not control, the exercise of the
agency’s professional policy judgment. Regulatory peer review thus would have to be mindful
that, in getting from point A to point B, an agency may have the discretion or the mandate to rely
on an integration of science and other policy factors, whereas the peer review must be limited to
the science alone.

38

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-99-99, PEER REVIEW PRACTICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE
AGENCIES VARY 1-10 (Mar. 1999).
39
Some specific examples subject to peer review included NOAA fisheries stock assessments, Agricultural
Research Service project plans, and National Institutes of Health reviews of intramural research. See id. at
18-39.
40
For information on EPA’s Science Advisory Board, see http://www.epa.gov/sab/about.htm. For
information on the FDA’s Advisory Committees, see http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2004/104_adv.html.
41
Indeed, as Wendy Wagner points out, case-specific regulatory decisions usually rely, at least in part, on
“unvalidated industry science.” Wagner, Bad Science, supra note __, at 73.
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To make these distinctions more concrete, it is helpful to revisit the context of the
Klamath and the ESA. The ESA is a science-based statute dedicated to conserving and restoring
populations of endangered species; as a result, it provides numerous opportunities for agency
officials to rely on scientific data in a policy setting.42 Section 4 of the Act, for example,
authorizes FWS and NOAA to identify “endangered” and “threatened” species, known as the
“listing” function,43 and then to designate “critical habitat”44 and to develop “recovery plans” for
the species.45 Section 7 requires all federal agencies to ensure that actions they carry out, fund, or
authorize do not “jeopardize” the continued existence of listed species or “adversely modify”
their critical habitat.46 Section 9 requires that all persons, including all private and public entities
subject to federal jurisdiction, avoid committing “take” of listed species of fish and wildlife.47
Sections 7 (for federal actions) and 10 (for actions not subject to Section 7) establish a procedure
and criteria for FWS and NOAA to approve “incidental take” of listed species.48

42

We each have had the pleasure of being asked to make presentations and write commentary for
publication about the ESA more than several times. Out of necessity, the materials in this “background”
section of this Article are a variation, tailored for the instant purposes, of a template one of us has
developed and used to inform readers not familiar with the ESA of the statute’s basic structure. Similar
treatments, in other words, appear elsewhere. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note __, at 412-17. Like the other
work, this Article is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the ESA. Rather, it uses the
ESA in this section as a case study for understanding how peer review would operate in regulatory
contexts. For comprehensive treatments of the ESA, several of which are referred to frequently infra, see
LAWRENCE R. LIEBESMAN AND RAFE PETERSEN, ENDANGERED SPECIES DESKBOOK (2003); ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES (Donald C. Baur and Wm. Robert Irvin eds., 2002);
STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SOCIETY, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001); TONY A. SULLINS,
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (2001); MICHAEL J. BEAN AND MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (3d ed., 1997).
43
16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2000). For a description of the listing process, see SELS, supra note __, at 38–
58; LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note __, at 15–20; SULLINS, supra note __, at 11–25; J.B. Ruhl, Section
4 of the ESA: The Keystone of Species Protection Law, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note __,
at 19.
44
16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2000). For a description of the critical habitat designation process, see SELS,
supra note __, at 59–69; LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note __, at 20–24; SULLINS, supra note __, at 26–
28; Federico Cheever, Endangered Species Act: Critical Habitat, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES,
supra note __, at 47; Murray D. Feldman & Michael J. Brennan, The Growing Importance of Critical
Habitat for Species Conservation, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 88 (2001). See also infra notes __-__ and
accompanying text.
45
16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2000). For a description of the recovery plan process, see SELS, supra note __, at
71–77; LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note __, at 24–26; SULLINS, supra note __, at 34–38; John M.
Volkman, Recovery Planning, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note __, at 71.
46
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). For a description of the consultation process, see SELS, supra note __, at
83–103; LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note __, at 27–39; SULLINS, supra note __, at 59–86; Marilyn
Averill, Protecting Species Through Interagency Cooperation, in LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES, supra
note __, at 87.
47
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000). For a description of the cases developing the legal standards for what
constitutes “take,” see SELS, supra note __, at 104–12; LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note __, at 39–45;
SULLINS, supra note __, at 44–53; Gina Guy, Take Prohibitions and Section 9, in LAW, POLICY, AND
PERSPECTIVES, supra note __, at 191; Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use
Activities “Take” Listed Wildlife Under ESA Section 9 and the “Harm” Regulation?, in LAW, POLICY, AND
PERSPECTIVES, supra note __, at 207; Alan M. Glen & Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult
Questions of Proximity and Degree, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 65 (2001).
48
16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4), 1539(a)(1) (2000). “Incidental take,” although not the subject of a specific
statutory definition provision, is described elsewhere in the statute as a take that is “incidental to, and not
the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.” Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B). The FWS and NOAA
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Each of these provisions involves an intersection between policy decisions and scientific
determinations. In the standard-setting role of listing species, for example, FWS and NOAA must
decide whether a species is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its
range (endangered) or whether it is likely to become so in the foreseeable future (threatened).50
This requires a series of scientific determinations about the species’ taxonomy—if indeed it is a
species51—its range, the present and threatened injuries to its habitat,52 whether it is being overutilized for commercial purposes or threatened by disease or predation, whether these threats are
enough to cause it to go extinct, and, if so, when. A similar law–science confluence appears in
policy application settings such as enforcement of the jeopardy prohibition found in Section 7,
which was the driving legal standard in the Klamath River Basin. The statute requires FWS and
NOAA to assess whether the direct and indirect effects of a proposed federal agency action will
jeopardize the continued existence of the species53 by appreciably reducing its chances of
recovery and survival in the wild.54 To reach a decision on that question, FWS and NOAA must
determine as a scientific matter the nature and magnitude of impacts the action will have on
reproduction, numbers, or distribution of the species and how much any such impacts will reduce
the species’ chances of surviving and recovering in the wild.55
Clearly, regulatory agencies such as FWS and NOAA cannot easily avoid the science
component of their mandates in regulatory applications. Indeed, to manage these and other
necessary scientific judgments under the ESA, the statute mandates agencies to apply a “best
scientific data available” standard. For example, when deciding whether to list a species, FWS
and NOAA must consider factors such as loss of habitat using only “the best scientific and
commercial data available.”56 Similarly, the biological component of the decision whether to

have adopted this meaning for purposes of the regulations implementing section 7. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02
(2003). For a description of the incidental take authorization procedures, see SELS, supra note __, at 127–
73; LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note __, at 46–50; SULLINS, supra note __, at 87–102.
50
These are the definitions of endangered species and threatened species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6), (20)
(2000).
51
For a comprehensive comparison of the biological and legal conceptions of “species,” see Blake Hood,
Transgenic Salmon and the Definition of “Species” Under the Endangered Species Act, 18 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 75, 78–98 (2002) (“The scientific consensus on ‘species’ . . . is that no complete consensus
exists and that different definitions suit different purposes.”). The default position in science as to what
constitutes a species relies on Ernst Mayr’s “biological species concept,” which focuses on reproductive
isolation. See id. at 81–82. Still, actually defining the boundaries of a species and deciding whether a
particular organism belongs to one or another involves complex observational, morphological, and genetic
considerations. See id. at 82–83. For additional discussion of the debate surrounding how to define a
species, both legally and scientifically, see SELS, supra note __, at 31–38; LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra
note __, at 11–15; SULLINS, supra note __, at 6–11; Doremus, supra note __, at 1087–1112. Several cases
turn on whether FWS or NOAA has correctly defined what constitutes a species within the meaning of the
statute. See LIEBESMAN & PETERSEN, supra note 1, at 11–15 (providing comprehensive discussion about
definition of species).
52
This and the remaining questions posed for the listing function are taken from the statutory criteria. 16
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A)–(E) (2000).
53
This is the statutory prohibition of jeopardy. Id. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring agencies to ensure no agency
action jeopardizes a listed species).
54
The agency regulations elaborate on the statute with this definition of “jeopardize.” See 50 C.F.R. §
402.02 (2003) (defining jeopardy).
55
These are the criteria set forth in the regulatory definition. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2003).
56
Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
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designate critical habitat must use the “best scientific data available.”57 And the “no jeopardy”
and “no adverse modification” directives to federal agencies, which rely on a case-specific
consultation procedure between the action agency and ESA agency with jurisdiction over the
species in question,58 adopt the same standard.59
While these provisions clearly infuse a science-based mandate in the agencies’ regulatory
functions, they just as clearly provide that the agencies will use science rather than do science.60
As described earlier, peer review is normally associated more with the latter—with the actual
practice of science and presentation and defense of scientific conclusions. Regulatory agencies
generally do not engage in original scientific research to make regulatory decisions. Perhaps they
have decided that so long as they rely on peer reviewed science, subjecting their decisions to a
second layer of peer review would be redundant.
Indeed, few regulatory agencies ever subject their regulatory decisions to peer review,
and those that do limit the practice principally to standard-setting decisions.61 For example, under
a policy FWS and NOAA adopted in 1994 with respect to species-listing decisions, the agencies
promise to “incorporate independent peer review in listing and recovery activities.”62 Notably,
the policy does not apply to any of the agencies’ action-specific permitting authorities, such as
jeopardy consultations under Section 7 or incidental take-permitting under Sections 7 and 10 of
the statute.63 This goes farther than most regulatory agencies have been willing to consider, yet
does not reach what Congress and White House would require.

III.

THE CASE FOR PEER REVIEW

Despite the controversy over mandating regulatory peer review, both sides agree on the
overall goal—regulatory agencies that make decisions based in whole or in part on scientific
research should seek to ensure their decisions accurately interpret and employ the research
results. Improving agency decisionmaking is hardly a new concern, of course. Indeed, many
methodologies to ensure sound agency decisions are already firmly embedded in the basic
standards of administrative law prescribed under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).64
These rules require the courts to apply considerable deference to the agency’s decision. A
reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for the agency, but must undertake a “thorough,
probing, in-depth review” of the agency’s decision.65 Thus, a court will reject an agency’s
decision if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with

57

Id. § 1533(b)(2).
Id. § 1536(a)(2), (b)–(c).
59
Id. § 1536(c); 50 C.F.R. 402.14(g)(8) (2003).
60
See Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 2002 WL 1733618 at *9 (D.D.C. 2002).
61
See Noah, supra note __, at __.
62
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for Peer
Review in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,270, 34,270 (July 1, 1994). This process,
they explain, will involve “[s]olicit[ing] the expert opinions of three appropriate and independent
specialists regarding pertinent scientific or commercial data and assumptions relating to the taxonomy,
population models, and supportive biological and ecological information for species under consideration
for listing.” Id. We assess the results of this ESA peer review in Section IV, infra.
63
For example, neither FWS nor NOAA instituted peer review for their respective decisions in the Klamath
controversy.
64
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
65
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
58
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law.”66 An agency decision is arbitrary and capricious if the agency either “has relied on factors
which Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise,”67 or if it has failed to “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”68
A scientist would be accused of practicing unsound science in research if he or she
declared that relevant data was ignored or altered in reaching the research conclusion simply
because the data did not support the conclusion.69 Likewise, under the foregoing rules of judicial
review an agency would be chastised for doing the same in reaching the decision of a rulemaking
or an adjudication. Such misuse of scientific date would be arbitrary and capricious, and any
court reviewing the decision would know to strike it down as a violation of the APA.70 A court
would not need to employ new principles or methodologies to justify such a ruling.
This is a powerful rebuttal to the general advocacy of “sound science” for agency
decisionmaking, but it does not adequately address arguments for using regulatory peer review to
identify cases in which, as in the Klamath, an agency uses properly assembled scientific data but
reaches a policy decision not supported by the data. Recall that the available fisheries data did
not provide a clear basis for concluding that reduced water levels would jeopardize the
endangered fish populations. The policy decision to halt irrigation flows was not a misuse of
science, but it certainly was not dictated by the science, either. Such a decision could result from
an agency’s innocent misunderstanding of the science or from its lack of expertise. Or, of course,
it could result from an agency’s deliberate attempt to stretch the available science in support of its
policy decision farther than is justified. This need not lead to a bad policy decision. After all,
agencies may have no choice but to extrapolate from incomplete data when a decision needs to be
made at that moment. It can be a bad thing, however, if the decision is justified as being driven
chiefly by the science rather than chiefly a policy decision based on inconclusive science.
Whether an agency’s overreliance on data is intentional or not, the APA’s procedural
safeguards are unlikely to be effective when no overt suppression or manipulation of data is
involved. Interested parties may argue that the agency has oversold its science, but, as interested
parties, they may be equally guilty of that practice. Faced with competing versions of what the
available science means, a court is in no position itself to conduct a reliable peer review and
would thus lean decidedly toward deferring to the agency’s version, as it must under the APA.
Regulatory peer review therefore may have something to offer in such cases, which, given the
scientific uncertainty present in many regulatory decisions, may actually be quite common.
The fact is, peer review is neither mandated by most environmental laws nor required
through the default administrative law doctrines of the APA. Some attributes of regulatory peer
review are already present in conventional administrative law processes, but these fall short of
66

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (State Farm), 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
68
Id. (citation omitted).
69
See, e.g., Gretchen Vogel et al., Ecologists Roiled by Misconduct Case, 303 SCI. 606 (2004) (reporting
developments concerning allegations that a world-renowned ecologist fabricated data in a published study
of genetic fitness traits).
70
See, e.g., Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash 1988) (holding the decision
not to list the owl was arbitrary and capricious in light of the biologists’ findings).
67
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peer review’s promise. Public participation in regulatory decisions through notice and comment
for rulemaking and representation in adjudicatory proceedings, for example, provide a form of
outside review. But they are neither limited to experts nor do they screen out biased members of
the public..71 Indeed, quite the opposite is true—only biased members are likely to get involved.
After all, if one does not have a vested in the regulation, why bother to get involved? Judicial
review of agency decisions ensures a close review by an ostensibly unbiased party, but it cannot
approach the same level of expertise provided by peer review. Moreover, judges must adhere to
the review standards of the APA, not those of scientific peer review.72 Peer review, in other
words, is the one clear demand of the “sound science” movement that administrative law does not
already require.
Still, that regulatory peer review is not already required hardly compels the case for
requiring it. So why do it? What benefits does peer review offer regulation that other procedural
safeguards do not? The promised benefits of integrating peer review into the regulatory
decisionmaking process are both substantive and procedural. Advocates argue that providing
independent expert feedback will generally improve the quality of regulatory decisions.73 Like
Representative Walden’s folksy reference to a doctor’s second opinion,74 in its initial proposal for
mandatory peer review OMB asserted that peer review can “provide a vital second opinion on the
science that underlies federal regulation.”75 Proponents argue that the use of independent, outside
experts in regulatory peer review should also enhance the legitimacy of the regulatory process by
reducing the appearance of agency bias and conflict of interest.76
Other than pointing to the Klamath experience, however, what theoretical or empirical
support do advocates of regulatory peer review advance for the claim that what is good for
science is good for regulation? This section lays out the central chain of reasoning behind leading
regulatory peer review proposals. There are, in fact, good reasons to believe that agencies face
institutional biases and pressures that could systematically lead employees to overstate how much
the available science supports a particular policy decision. In addition, our survey revealed that
practitioners of environmental law working primarily in the private sector harbor a deep distrust
of agencies in this regard, a distrust based, we presume, not primarily on political theory but on
personal perspective and practical experience. And the thrust of regulatory peer review in
Congress and the White House has clearly been in response to these perceived defects in agency
process.

A.

Institutional Theory

A key assumption underlying regulatory peer review proposals is that there is a problem
that needs to be fixed—agencies often, perhaps systematically, present scientific data as moving a
policy decision closer to point B than is justified. To be sure, some advocates of peer review
support this assertion with no more than a basic distrust of government and regulation. But

71

See Noah, supra note __, at 1074–76. OMB makes the point, in its final peer review policy, that “peer
review should not be confused with public comment and other stakeholder processes.” OMB Final
Bulletin, supra note __, 70 Fed. Reg. at 2665.
72
See Noah, supra note __, at 1076–77.
73
See Lars Noah, Peer Review and Regulatory Reform, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10606, 10608
(2000).
74
See supra note __.
75
See OMB Proposed Bulletin, supra note __, 68 Fed. Reg. at 54,024.
76
See OMB Proposed Bulletin, supra note __, 68 Fed. Reg. at 54,024.
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political science theory suggests why, quite apart from anti-regulatory agendas, one might be
concerned over agency use of science,.
There is an immense literature on the institutional challenges inherent in agency
operation, and many of these theories explain why agencies might selectively use scientific data
in a biased or incomplete manner.77 The theory of agency mission focus, for example, asserts that
single-mission agencies tend zealously to further their statutory missions in a single-minded
fashion.78 This is a variant on the theories of agency capture and public choice, in which the
agency comes to view furthering the interests of the regulated community as more important to its
mission than protecting the more amorphous public interest.79
Personal bias can also play a role. Most biologists who work for the FWS or NOAA,
one could reasonably imagine, care personally about conserving wildlife—that is why they
became wildlife biologists and have devoted their careers to working in an agency dedicated to
wildlife conservation. If the neutrality of agency biologists is not to be trusted, this argument
suggests—and this is clearly an underlying premise of the “sound science” movement—it is
because they are agency biologists with “shared biases,” not because they are simply biologists.80
Finally, and perhaps most important, agencies work in an environment of serious
resource- and time-constraints. The conclusion of the Klamath Committee, for example, was not
that the agency decisionmakers dissembled or acted in bad faith. Rather, with decisions needing
to be made within demanding time frames, often on the basis of uncertain and inconclusive data,
the decisionmakers chose a course that experts at a later date, with more time and expertise to
review the data, concluded was not supported by the available information. One need not adopt a
cynical view of agency behavior to understand why the exigencies of making complicated
decisions in a short period based on uncertain or conflicting data can sometimes lead to decisions
with inadequate scientific support.81 Sympathy for agencies may be due on this score;
nevertheless, time- and resource-constraints do appear to be yet one more reason to believe that
agencies may reach decisions that lack a firm scientific basis.
Arguing against the use of peer review in regulatory agencies, therefore, invites
accusations of trying to obscure the flaws of agency practice. Advocates of peer review contend
that it is the light that will expose those flaws, leading to the improved quality of agency
decisions and revealing the biases of agency decisionmakers. On the surface, therefore, peer
review may have something to offer administrative law in general.
At the same time, regulatory peer review clearly imposes costs on agencies that are
already operating under tight resource constraints. One can agree with all the theoretical
explanations of why agencies might portray science as doing more for their policy decisions than
77

Wendy Wagner’s comprehensive study of these institutional forces remains the classic study of the topic
in the context of science and policy. See Wagner, Science Charade, supra note __, at 1650-72. In general,
an understanding of these institutional theories is considered a foundation of administrative law. See
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 1.7, 16-23 (3d ed. 1999).
78
See PIERCE ET AL., supra note __, at 17-18.
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See PIERCE ET AL., supra note __, at 18-19.
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See PIERCE ET AL., supra note __, at 21-22.
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The Klamath Committee recognized that “agencies may recommend practices for which the committee
would find virtually no direct scientific support. The committee acknowledges the necessity of this
practice in many situations where information is inadequate for development of scientifically rigorous
decisions.” KLAMATH COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT, supra note __, at 119.
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is justified. One can fully embrace the arguments explaining why peer review will improve
agency decisions. But, taken singly or together, these alone do not providing compelling
justifications for greater use of regulatory peer review simply because it is just not clear how
many Klamaths are out there. Whether an intentional or a good faith mistake, how frequent are
agency regulatory decisions purported to be based on science that would fail the test of peer
review? Without a sense of how big a problem this poses, advocates of regulatory peer review
cannot state with any confidence that its theoretical benefits outweigh the actual costs of
implementation.
B.

Empirical Analysis: Faith, Perceptions, and Demand

We know of no comprehensive empirical study comparing regulatory decisions with and
without peer review or attempting to re-evaluate past regulatory decisions using peer review
methods or estimating the costs of broad-based regulatory peer review. Beyond political theory,
in other words, the case for regulatory peer review is based largely on faith—faith in the gospel
that agencies do in fact overstate how far their science carries them.
Faith, however, is a powerful force when shared by a multitude. If enough of the public
believes agencies make poor use of science, that this leads to policy failures, and that regulatory
peer review is an effective check on the problem, arguments for imposing regulatory peer review
will have traction. Even more compelling, if enough of those who share these beliefs are
experienced in administrative law and policy—can claim to have practical experience with
agency regulatory practices—then the public is less likely to demand empirical study of the issue
before acting to put regulatory peer review in place. Indeed, this is precisely what our survey
showed to be the case.
The survey was designed to elicit respondents’ perceptions about the performance of
regulatory agencies, the merits of regulatory peer review, and the design of regulatory peer
review.82 With respect to agency performance, the survey posed a general question and many
detailed ones relating to different attributes of agency use of science. Responses indicated a
82

The complete survey is available on the web at xxx. We provided respondents the following definition
of regulatory peer review:
Regulatory Peer Review is the outside evaluation of an administrative agency’s search,
selection, or use of scientific data used to support a proposed regulatory decision (rule,
permit, or other policy). The evaluation is conducted prior to the agency’s final decision
by one or more experts in the relevant field who are independent of the agency and have
no pecuniary or other conflict of interest with respect to the outcome of the agency’s
decision.

We sent the survey to 900 randomly selected members of the American Bar Association’s Section
of the Environment, Energy, and Resources (SEER), of whom almost 200 responded. We chose
SEER because the leading edge of the regulatory peer review debate has focused on environmental
law and SEER is a prominent forum for practitioners of environmental law in private practice,
government, academic, and other practice settings. The survey was voluntary and responses were
anonymous. We greatly appreciate SEER’s cooperation in providing the member names and their
contact information (SEER did not commission, direct, or in any other way influence the design or
implementation of the survey). All funding for the survey and the data analysis was provided by
The Florida State University College of Law. We thank FSU Department of Statistics Professor
Kai-Sheng Song and graduate student Han Yu for their assistance in compiling and analyzing the
survey data.
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significant background level of concern over agency use of science among experienced
practitioners.83 Indeed, in more detailed questions, respondents revealed a deep mistrust of
agency behavior. Figure 1 shows the percentage of responses to specific statements about
components of agency use of science.
Figure 1. We asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree that the following
statements describe agency resources and practices. Figures show percent of respondents in each category.

a. Agencies generally have sufficient
time to conduct adequate searches for
and analyses of scientific data relevant to
their decisions.
b. Agencies generally have sufficient
budgets to conduct adequate searches for
and analyses of scientific data relevant to
their decisions.
c. Agencies generally have sufficient
expertise to conduct adequate searches
for and analyses of scientific data
relevant to their decisions.
d. Agencies generally place an adequate
priority on searching for scientific data
relevant to their decisions.
e. Agencies usually select data that have
adequate scientific reliability.

f. Agencies generally place appropriate
reliance on scientific data that support
their preferred decisions.
g. Agencies generally give appropriate
recognition to scientifically reliable data
that contradict their preferred decisions.
h. Agencies usually employ adequate
scientific analysis when using the data
they present as supporting their final
decisions.
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Unsurprisingly, and consistent with institutional theory, many respondents, believe that
agencies face significant time and resource constraints in their use of science (questions a through
c). More troublesome was the level of concern respondents revealed about how agencies
83

The general question asked respondents to state their level of agreement or disagreement with the
statement that “based on my experience, administrative agencies usually employ adequate procedures for
the search, selection, and use of scientific data in regulatory decision making.” Although 41 percent of
respondents stated some level of agreement with the statement, 51 percent somewhat or strongly disagreed

20

REGULATORY PEER REVIEW

84 WASHINGTON UNIV. L. REV. 1 (2006)

prioritize their search for data and about how they select and rely data in support of their
decisions, with almost half of respondents expressing negative perceptions of agency
behavior(questions d through f). Most startling, however, were the responses to the final two
questions in the series (questions g and h). Over 70 percent of respondents disagreed, 20 percent
strongly so, with the statement that agencies generally give appropriate recognition to
scientifically reliable data that contradict their preferred decisions, and 56 percent of respondents
disagreed with the statement that agencies usually employ adequate scientific analysis when using
the data they present as supporting their final decisions. The overall picture these responses paint
is that many experienced practitioners understand that agencies face time and resource constraints
in their use of science, but even more believe agencies engage in practices that could lead to
overstating the scientific support for their regulatory decisions.
Of course, not all respondents felt this way, and what sharpens the difference of opinion
even more is the background of respondents with favorable views of agencies versus those with
negative views.84 Not surprisingly, respondents who indicated federal or state agency
government employment (combined in a regrouping designated as “Govt”) as their primary career
experience, which made up 15 percent of the respondent pool, were far more likely to hold
favorable views of agency use of science than were respondents with primarily private law firm
or in-house careers representing corporations (combined in a regrouping designated “Corp”),
which accounted for 73 percent of respondents. For example, government respondents were over
four times more likely than industry respondents to agree with the general statement that agencies
85
usually employ adequate procedures. Figure 2 shows how extensive this difference of opinion
was for each of the specific questions about agency performance:
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One of the underlying premises of proposals for regulatory peer review is that there is, or at least may be,
a prevalence of regulatory decisions that are not adequately grounded in scientific support. We suspected
that private sector attorneys may be more likely than public sector attorneys to believe there is such a
problem, and thus we grouped the respondent population based on whether the respondent had practiced
primarily in the private or public sector over the course of his or her career. We designed our survey
questions to obtain respondents’ perceptions about a variety of topics that any experienced environmental
lawyer could find controversial and aligned with particular political and economic interests. As such, we
recognize that responses may be affected by factors such as whether the respondent represents industry or
government, believes in strong government or libertarian principles, and so on. Lawyers that represent
industry might have rushed to condemn agencies’ use of science in their responses, and lawyers
representing government might have taken every opportunity to praise them. That is the nature of
qualitative perceptions surveys. As we explain in Parts III and IV of the Article, as important as it is to
know the actual performance of a regulatory agency in its use of science, we believe it is also vital to
understand perceptions of the need for and efficacy of regulatory peer review, biased as they may by
practice setting, client base, and political predisposition, because of the effect those perceptions will have
on the demand for regulatory peer review and in shaping the legitimacy of the agency’s decisions.
85

Since the responses called for in our survey are clearly ordinal in nature, we used the logistic
regression method of statistical analysis for answering various questions of interest throughout our study.
For example, to determine the influence of government work on perceptions of regulatory peer review, we
treated the two practice setting categories as the explanatory variable X, and the responses to perceptions of
regulatory peer review were coded on a scale from 1 to k; for example, 1-5 corresponding to strongly agree,
somewhat agree, no opinion, somewhat disagree, and strongly disagree. The score for each question was
treated as the response variable Y and the k possible scores of Y are called the response categories. The
principal objective of a statistical analysis is to investigate the relationship between the explanatory
variable X and the response variable Y. The ordinal nature of the responses leads naturally to statistical
models based on the cumulative response probabilities of observing response categories less than or equal
to a given score j, when the covariate is X. More specifically, we are interested in investigating the
influence of the explanatory variable X on the cumulative response probability up to and including category
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Figure 2. The second column shows which group, federal or state government career (Govt) or private firm
or in-house corporate career (Corp), was significantly more likely to agree with the statement in the first
column (i.e., to answer “strongly agree” or “somewhat agree”), based on the breakdown between the two
groups who agreed (third and fourth column) and on the odds (fifth column) that a person selected
randomly from the more likely group would agree compared to a person selected randomly from the less
likely group:

More Likely to
Agree
a. Agencies generally have sufficient
time to conduct adequate searches for
and analyses of scientific data relevant to
their decisions.
b. Agencies generally have sufficient
budgets to conduct adequate searches for
and analyses of scientific data relevant to
their decisions.
c. Agencies generally have sufficient
expertise to conduct adequate searches
for and analyses of scientific data
relevant to their decisions.
d. Agencies generally place an adequate
priority on searching for scientific data
relevant to their decisions.
e. Agencies usually select data that have
adequate scientific reliability.

f. Agencies generally place appropriate
reliance on scientific data that support
their preferred decisions.

g. Agencies generally give appropriate
recognition to scientifically reliable data
that contradict their preferred decisions.
h. Agencies usually employ adequate
scientific analysis when using the data
they present as supporting their final
decisions.
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Ironically, agency attorneys revealed less concern than did industry attorneys about the
adequacy of agency time and resources. With respect to agency behavior, however, agency
attorneys fall in line with institutional theory in expressing tremendous support for agency
j. The logistic regression method of examining such relationships involves modeling the logarithm of the
odds of the event of observing response categories up to and including category j as a function of the
explanatory variable X through a linear regression equation.
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performance—far more so than did the industry attorneys. Moreover, with government attorneys
accounting for most of the favorable opinion of agency performance, notwithstanding their lower
representation numbers in the survey, the negative perception of agency use of science among
industry attorneys was remarkably deep and broadly shared.
Our survey reveals a sharp difference of opinion between agency lawyers and lawyers
representing industry about agency use of science. Interest groups associated with environmental
causes, however, also hold to the faith that agencies may not adequately ground their decisions in
science. Studies have shown that support for peer review under the ESA, for example, is strong
in both the industry and the environmental camps, but such support is almost always limited to
applying review to the types of decisions each interest group finds the most troublesome. Dr.
Deborah Brosnan has found, for example, that more than sixty prominent lobbying groups
representing a diverse array of interests actively supported using peer review under the ESA, but
that “each group favors review of actions that it finds unpalatable. Development groups want
fewer species listings and therefore demand review of listing decisions . . . . Environmental
groups are concerned about habitat loss under HCPs and want them independently reviewed.”86
Indeed, in recent years some of the most vocal critics of agency use of science are
scientists and environmental groups, who have made widespread allegations that political
appointees in the Bush administration have forced agency scientists to manipulate, suppress, and
distort scientific data.87 One group of prominent scientists endorsed a statement accusing the
Bush Administration in general of misusing science.88 Democrat members of Congress have
produced reports accusing agencies of intentional suppression and distortion of scientific data89
and of practicing “weird science.”90 Even scientists within NOAA have recently claimed that
they have witnessed outright suppression and distortion of science within their agency.91 In short,
the perception that agencies rely on inadequate scientific support for their decisions has begun to
transcend neat political boxes.
It is not surprising that different denominations share the faith that agencies sometimes
oversell the extent to which science supports their decisions. Regulatory agencies deal with so
many issues affecting so many interest groups that an agency will eventually offend almost every
interest group with whom it deals enough times to raise the group’s concern over the use of
science in decisions that went against them. Perhaps in each matter it depends on whose ox the
agency gores, but over time, if the agency gores everyone’s ox, the reliability of agency science
can become fair game for all.
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Deborah M. Brosnan, Can Peer Review Help Resolve Natural Resource Conflicts?, 16 ISSUES IN
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 32, 33 (2000).
87
See generally MOONEY, REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE, supra note __, at 14-24, 78-248.
88
See
Restoring
Scientific
Integrity
Signatories,
available
at
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_environment/rsi/page.cfm?pageID+1335.
89
See MINORITY STAFF OF COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, POLITICS AND SCIENCE IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION,
available
at
http://www.house.gov/reform/min/politicsandscience/pdfs/pdf_politics_and_science_rep.pdf (Nov. 13,
2004).
90
See DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF COMM. ON RESOURCES, WEIRD SCIENCE: THE INTERIOR DEPARTMENT’S
MANIPULATION
OF
SCIENCE
FOR
POLITICAL
PURPOSES,
available
at
http://www.ourforests.org/wierdscience.pdf (dec. 17, 2002).
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See Officials, Scientists Spar over Whether Politics Trumps Science at NMFS, Endangered Species &
Wetlands Rep., June 2005, at 14-15.
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But the breadth of this perception does not itself explain the extensive support for
regulatory peer review. Here again, however, we found what appears to be a strong set of beliefs
in the merit of regulatory peer review and what it could accomplish. Figure 3 shows the extent to
which practitioners of environmental law turn to regulatory peer review as an answer to the
perceived misuse of science by agencies:
Figure 3. We asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the following
statements about the potential effects of applying Regulatory Peer Review to proposed regulatory
decisions. Figures show the percent of respondents in each category:

a. It is likely to lead to substantial
improvements in the quality of agency
decisions.
b. It is likely to reveal significant flaws
in the ways agencies generally search
for, select, or use scientific data.
c.
It is likely to improve public
confidence in agency decisions.
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The perception that regulatory peer review is the answer to agency misuse of science
appears to be overwhelming, with well over 65 percent agreeing that it will improve the quality of
agency decisions, expose flaws in agency use of science, and improve public confidence in
agencies, and only 20 percent or less disagreeing that each of those expected benefits will accrue.
Yet, given how little regulatory peer review is employed today in agency practice, what is the
foundation for this set of beliefs?
Once again, it appears to be little more than faith, for most of our respondents had never
had direct contact with regulatory peer review. Over 60 percent of our respondents had neither
represented a client in a matter undergoing regulatory peer review, nor advocated about whether
to adopt regulatory peer review, nor even counseled a client generally about what regulatory peer
review is. Indeed, as further support that views on regulatory peer review are largely based on
faith, we were not surprised to find that government and industry attorneys differed about the
effects of regulatory peer review, as shown in Figure 4, though we were no less than shocked by
the degree of disagreement.
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Figure 4. The second column shows which group, federal or state government career (Govt) or private
firm/in-house corporate career (Corp), was significantly more likely agree with the statement in the first
column (i.e., answer “strongly agree” or “somewhat agree”), based on the breakdown between the two
groups of who agreed (third and fourth column) and on the odds that a person selected randomly from the
more likely group would agree compared to a person selected randomly from the less likely group (fifth
column):

a. It is likely to lead to substantial
improvements in the quality of agency
decisions
b. It is likely to reveal significant flaws
in the ways agencies generally search
for, select, or use scientific data
c.
It is likely to improve public
confidence in agency decisions
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Agency attorneys, according to our results, simply do not buy into the idea that regulatory
peer review has anything salutary to offer their work. But with industry attorneys twelve times
more likely than agency attorneys to believe regulatory peer review will expose flaws in agency
procedures, twenty times more likely to believe it will improve public confidence in agencies, and
thirty-three times more likely to believe it will improve the quality of agency decisions, can
agencies afford to ignore the magnitude of counter-perception that appears to have taken hold
among those who practice before them?
C.

Meeting the Demand

Our survey results suggest that demand for regulatory peer review is strong among
experienced practitioners of regulatory law, particularly those who represent industry clients
before agencies. Responding to that demand, the Bush Administration has supported the policy
that federal agencies broadly employ more rigorous peer review in their decisionmaking
processes.92 Indeed the centerpiece of the Bush Administration’s “sound science” push has been
OMB’s peer review policy. Based ostensibly on authority granted in the Data Quality Act,93
OMB’s approach requires federal agencies to conduct “appropriate and scientifically rigorous
92

See OMB Revised Bulletin, supra note __, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,230 (“peer review improves both the
quality of scientific information and the public’s confidence in the integrity of science”), OMB Proposed
Bulletin, supra note __, 68 Fed. Reg. at 54,024 (“Independent, objective peer review has long been
regarded as a critical element in ensuring the reliability of scientific analyses.”).
93
The Data Quality Act, also known as the Information Quality Act, is actually a set of provisions
embedded in a 2001 appropriations bill, and requires, among other things, that OMB “issue
guidelines…that provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing
the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information…disseminated by Federal agencies”). Treasury
and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515(a), 114
Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2001). For a history of the political figures and events that led to the Data
Quality Act, see MOONEY, REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE, supra note __, at 102-20.
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peer review” of “influential scientific information” and of “highly influential scientific
assessments” an agency disseminates to the public.”94 In its initial September 2003 proposal,
OMB claimed this mandate would “improve the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of
information disseminated by the Federal Government to the public,” because it would “provide a
vital second opinion on the science that underlies federal regulation.”95
OMB responded to a wide range of comments on its initial proposal96 and published a
revised proposal in April, 2004.97 Deleting its prior assertion that regulatory peer review is
tantamount to a “second opinion,” OMB then asserted that peer review would evaluate:
the clarity of hypotheses, the validity of the research design, the quality of the data
collection procedures, the robustness of the methods employed, the appropriateness of the
methods for the hypotheses being tested, the extent to which the conclusions follow from
the analysis, and the strengths and limitations of the overall project.98

OMB received more comments on the revised policy,99 though far fewer than on the
original proposal, and adopted a final policy in December 2004 with relatively minor
refinements.100 Under the final policy, agency information subject to review would include data,
synthesis of facts, models, analyses, and assessments that would have a clear and substantial
impact on public policies or private sector decisions. This could range from state of science
reports, meta-analyses, and risk assessments to toxicity profiles and health and ecology
assessments. Not all science underpinning decisions can be peer reviewed, of course, so the
decision must have $500 million of regulatory- or private-sector impact or novel, precedent
setting impact or significant inter-agency interest. If the data have already been subject to
adequate peer review (e.g., journal review), no further review is needed. Otherwise, the agency
must apply internal or external peer review by technical experts not associated with the work
product and must provide a summary or copy of comments to the public. The agency must
publicly respond to the peer review report, and in some cases public comment and hearing on the
draft peer review report may be appropriate.
On the legislative side, a series of “sound science” reform bills have been proposed in
Congress to amend the ESA. The “Sound Science for Endangered Species Act Planning Act of
2002,” introduced by Representative James Hansen (R-Utah), is the genesis of a line of such
legislation that has followed in similar spirit.101 In general, these proposals102 would alter the
procedures, standards of evidence, and burdens of proof under which federal agencies operate in
94

See OMB Revised Bulletin, supra note __, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23231; OMB Proposed Bulletin, supra note
__, 68 Fed. Reg. at 54,027. Some observers have questioned OMB’s authority to require peer review. See
Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10064
(2004).
95
See OMB Proposed Bulletin, supra note __, at 54023-24.
96
Public
comments
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the
OMB
Proposed
Bulletin
are
posted
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003iq/iq_list.html.
97
See OMB Revised Bulletin, supra note __.
98
OMB Revised Bulletin, supra note __, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,231.
99
Public
comments
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the
OMB
Revised
Bulletin
are
posted
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/peer2004/list_peer2004.html.
100
See OMB Final Bulletin, supra note __, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664.
101
H.R. 4840, 107th Cong. (2d Sess.) (2002).
102
For a more recent version, see S. 369, 108th Cong. (1st Sess.) (2003), and H.R. 1662, 108th Cong. (1st
Sess.) (2003). For a history of peer review provisions in ESA reform bills preceding H.R. 4840, see
Brennan et al., supra note __, at 433-40.
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carrying out ESA programs.103 The legislation would stiffen ESA procedures in many respects,
requiring FWS and NOAA to give preference to certain forms of evidence and apply more
rigorous burdens of proof to a long list of specified decisions. In particular, the bills would
require FWS and NOAA to give greater weight to field-tested and peer-reviewed data, accept
data from affected landowners, solicit data on recovery plans, and, most important, subject every
listing, critical habitat, recovery plan, and consultation decision to peer review by a three-expert
panel. The resulting process would institute a much more formal and probing peer review
process for many more ESA decisions than FWS imposed on itself under its internal 1994 peer
review policy.
The proposed ESA reforms have enjoyed strong support104 and engendered equally
strident criticism.105 The Bush Administration has generally supported the reforms with only
minor suggested changes.106 The House Resources Committee held hearings on Representative
Hansen’s bill in June 2002107 and reported it favorably on July 10, 2002, in a 22–18 vote that
followed party lines.108 It remains a good indication of what proposals to expect in the current
Congress, and to be supported in the Bush Administration, in the way of efforts to make the ESA
more “scientific” in method.109
OMB and Congress offer no empirical evidence for their rush to meet the demand for
regulatory peer review. But so what? The institutional theory supporting the case for peer review
is practically a given in administrative law scholarship, and the perception that agencies overstate
how far their science gets them appears to be widely held by attorneys and interest groups that
appear before regulatory agencies. In politics, that is usually more than enough. The debate has
not been one-sided, however, for there are significant objections to imposing regulatory peer
review. These are explored in the next section.
IV.

THE CASE AGAINST PEER REVIEW

Critics of mandating regulatory peer review have advanced two positions: First, evidence
that agencies frequently overstate the extent to which science supports a regulatory decision is
insufficient. Second, absent such evidence, even if there is a problem, they argue, peer review is
not the solution but rather a practice to be avoided at all costs. Not only will it fail to provide the
103

See Burke, supra note __, at 506-07.
See, e.g., NATIONAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT REFORM COALITION, H.R. 4840, THE SOUND SCIENCE
FOR ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT PLANNING ACT OF 2002, at http://www.nesarc.org/walden.htm (last visited
Jan. 19, 2004) (providing links to several relevant sites).
105
See, e.g., Press Release, Defenders of Wildlife, Statement by Rodger Schlickeisen, President of
Defenders of Wildlife, on Committee Markup HR 4840, a Bill that Purports to Offer “Sound Science” for
ESA (July 11, 2002), available at http://www.defenders.org/releases/pr2002/pr071102.html (calling the
proposal “one more effort by the ‘development at any cost’ crowd to gut the ESA”).
106
See DIVISION OF CONGRESSIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, FISH
WILDLIFE SERVICE TESTIMONY BEFORE THE 107TH CONGRESS, available at
AND
http://laws.fws.gov/testimon/2001/main2001.html (resonating that “sound science” has become a theme
across many programs in the Bush Administration).
107
Hearing of the House Resources Comm., Subcomm. On Fisheries Conservation, Wildlife and Oceans on
H.R. 4781 The Marine Mammal Prot. Act Amendments of 2002, (2002) at
http://www.legislative.noaa.gov/Archives/2002/hogarthhearingreport061302.pdf.
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promised benefits, they argue, but it will further politicize the decisionmaking process and slow
the agency process to the point of frustrating agencies’ missions to protect the public welfare.
They may be right in some circumstances, but when examined closely these arguments turn out to
rest on simply a different faith than the one held by the supporters of regulatory peer review.
A.

There is No Problem

Our survey revealed that attorneys representing agencies as the primary focus of their
careers generally believe that regulatory agencies adequately describe scientific support for
regulatory decisions. This is a theme of most critiques of regulatory peer review. For example,
Wendy Wagner asserts that “there are surprisingly few examples of EPA using unreliable science
or using science inappropriately to support a final regulation” and that “the examples of
regulatory bad science are winnowed down to a few, virtually all of which are contested.”110
Upon closer examination, however, the empirical support for such an assertion is unpersuasive, at
least respecting the kinds of regulatory decisions that concern us in this Article. For her general
assertion, she points to evidence such as testimony from an EPA official who merely denies the
agency misuses science, testimony of one independent scientist who makes the same assertion,
and a law review article observing not that empirical evidence supports her view, but rather that
although “there is widespread belief that many of the problems surrounding the law-science
interactions are attributable to junk science[,] [t]his hypothesis is largely unexamined . . . [,] [and]
there is no empirical evidence to support this conclusion.”111 She also discusses several expert
studies of EPA’s use of science, some of which suggest the agency could do better in its scientific
methodology, and others which are silent on the issue.112 More to the point, however, she
excludes from her assertion, as do all the other sources she references, “the larger universe of
regulatory decisions involving the grant of permits and licenses,”113 which is, of course, a
principal target of many proposals for regulatory peer review. In short, neither she nor anyone
else critiquing regulatory peer review has presented evidence based on systematic, objective
analysis of this meaningful universe of agencies’ regulatory decisions. Nevertheless, her
assertion is repeated in critiques of regulatory peer review as if it is an empirical fact and without
adding the caveats she provided.114
This is not to suggest that Wagner or other critics of regulatory peer review misrepresent
the data that are available on agency performance. There just is not much empirical evidence to
consider, pro or con. Indeed, if the argument is simply that there has been no comprehensive
empirical examination of whether and how often agencies overstate the support science lends to
their policy decisions, we agree. As the previous section shows, however, such an assertion is
adequate rebuttal of the case for regulatory peer review. One might argue that the burden is on
advocates of regulatory peer review to produce empirical proof that agencies exhibit this problem,
in which case that burden unquestionably has not been met.115 But why place the burden of
empirical proof on the side that wishes to apply this bedrock of science for over 300 years on
agencies that base their decisions in whole or in part on science? Given how crucial peer review
is to the scientific method, given the institutional forces that suggest agencies may often overstate
how far science gets them, and given the belief held by many industry and environmental
110

See Wagner, Bad Science, supra note __, at 72-73.
See id. at 72 n.38.
112
See id. at 73-77.
113
See id. at 73.
114
See Sidney Shapiro, The Case Against the IQA, THE ENVTL. F., July-Aug. 2005, at 26, __.
115
See Wagner, Bad Science, supra note __, at 76-78 (demonstrating “the failure of the reformers
themselves to document a problem”).
111

REGULATORY PEER REVIEW

28

84 WASHINGTON UNIV. L. REV. 1 (2006)

interests alike that agencies in fact do so, it is not unreasonable to expect critics of regulatory peer
review to demonstrate that what is good for science is ill-advised for regulation. Observing that a
data vacuum exists does not advance this cause.
B.

If There Is a Problem, Peer Review Is Not the Solution

Our survey revealed that attorneys representing agencies as the primary focus of their
careers generally believe that agencies do not overstate the scientific support for their regulatory
decisions. This is the fallback theme of most critiques of regulatory peer review. For example, in
response to OMB’s initial proposal for regulatory peer review, the American Association for the
Advancement of Science issued a resolution condemning the proposal on several grounds,
including that “there is no evidence that proposed new procedures are likely to improve the
quality of science used in the regulatory process.”116 Of course, there is no evidence regulatory
peer review is unlikely to do so, either. Yet, putting aside the issue of which side bears the burden
of proof in this regard, on this score the critics of regulatory peer review have some strong
institutional reasons for suggesting caution in its use.
One concern is that advocates of regulatory peer review promise too much and thus
distort the public’s expectations of agency practices. Recall that Representative Walden and the
OMB’s initial peer review proposal both portrayed regulatory peer review as a “second opinion.”
That sounds pretty attractive—after all, who would not want a second opinion before amputating
a limb? But peer review does not provide a second opinion in the conventional sense. Medical
doctors providing a second opinion examine the patient, not just the other doctor’s written
opinion. Scientists providing peer review for professional journals do not “examine the patient”
in the form of conducting independent experimentation or data analysis. As Lars Noah has
described, “policymakers often seem to conflate peer review with science itself, which in turn
may lead them to exaggerate the possible utility of independent expert scrutiny of decisions based
on science.”117
This concern is particularly acute in regulatory settings in which the best available
science is likely to prove inconclusive, forcing the agency to rely on professional judgment to
interpret the data and then, when permitted or required, to employ other policy considerations to
reach a final decision. Regulatory peer review will not close the data gaps or ensure that every
agency decision is fully supported by science.118 If advocates of regulatory peer review suggest
otherwise, they oversell to the public what regulatory peer review really offers.
This leads to another concern—that, far from advocates’ claims that peer review will
eliminate bias from agency decisions, it will actually exacerbate these concerns by allowing
agencies to mask their biases with the veneer of science. Agencies, themselves, can misuse peer
review. The ESA provides a particularly illustrative example. FWS and NOAA have long been
criticized for operating a “black box” style of decisionmaking—relatively closed to the public,
relying on informal channels of scientific communication, and generally unwilling to
communicate their data and scientific reasoning in a manner that facilitated review by the public
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and the courts.119 The 1994 peer review policy, described earlier,120 was intended to fix that—to
instill greater confidence in the public and the courts. These agencies pledged to “incorporate
independent peer review in listing and recovery activities.”121 This step would involve
“[s]olicit[ing] the expert opinions of three appropriate and independent specialists regarding
pertinent scientific or commercial data and assumptions relating to the taxonomy, population
models, and supportive biological and ecological information for species under consideration for
listing.”122 With this, the agencies proclaimed to have put the attributes of peer review into
motion.
In 2003, however, the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a study of how FWS
had implemented the peer review policy. Its findings were disturbing. Perhaps most important,
the process was informal and actually seemed to invite bias. The report noted that “Service
officials told us that they have not adopted a formal procedure to assess peer reviewers’
independence, and the Service does not publicly disclose . . . potential conflicts or prior
involvement by its peer reviewers.”123 Although the agency guidelines explained that
“[i]ndependent peer reviewers should be selected from the academic and scientific community,
Tribal and other native American groups, Federal and State agencies, and the private sector,”124
and that “those selected [should] have demonstrated expertise and specialized knowledge related
to the scientific area under consideration,”125 it was the agencies who selected their peer
reviewers, reviewed the peer reviews, and reported the results of the peer reviews.126 The GAO
found that FWS “peer reviewers are selected at the discretion of the field office scientists
responsible for developing listing and critical habitat decisions.”127 Not surprisingly, the study
noted that the people FWS chose to serve as peer reviewers usually agreed with the agencies’
119
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positions.128 Without independence of the reviewers ensured, this process and its results simply
invite charges of manipulation.
Similarly, while OMB justified its proposal in part by citing flaws in current federal
agency peer review practices such as those used by FWS, OMB does not provide an encouraging
example in its own actions. OMB has been required since 1997 to provide Congress an
accounting statement and a report on its guidelines issued to agencies that would estimate the
total annual costs and benefits of agency regulation and analyze the impacts of regulation on
small businesses, local, state and tribal governments, and economic growth.129 In 2000, Congress
required OMB to ensure an “independent, external peer review of the guidelines and each
accounting statement and associated report.” Research by Joanna Goger of OMB’s peer review
practice has revealed that the process has no internal guidelines, no conflict of interest disclosure
requirements, repeatedly uses the same reviewers, and has no requirement of balance.130 As one
reviewer wrote to OMB following his review of the 2001 report, “[a]t this point, you are likely
getting tired of my comments so that next year you might want to bring on a new reviewer in my
place.”131 Beyond the problem of hypocrisy—this process clearly fails to satisfy the procedures
called for in OMB’s proposal that other agencies must follow—is the institutional concern that
OMB seems to have followed the example of FWS. This suggests that agencies’ may
systematically tend to use peer review to support their decisions rather than as a critical outside
check on the accuracy of their decisions. In its worst extremes, then, peer review can become a
cynical exercise, allowing agencies to manipulate the process and rig outcomes to justify agency
decisions that might not withstand legitimate peer scrutiny.
The final major institutional critique against regulatory peer review is, even if the
preceding concerns—that peer review will improve agency decisions and not be politically
manipulated—are mistaken, the resources needed to carry out reviews will significantly delay
regulatory decisions. This is the “paralysis by analysis” charge leveled against other broad,
mandatory regulatory procedures such as cost-benefit analysis and risk assessments, criticized as
“offering regulatory relief for industry in the guise of more rational procedures.”132 Inflexibly
mandating rigorous peer review adds substantial demands on agency resources, potentially
draining resources from other decisionmaking components and, in many cases, impeding
decisionmaking altogether.133
Indeed, the deadlines Congress has frequently placed on agency decisionmaking
acknowledge the pressing need in many cases to intervene on policy problems. Agencies already
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have difficulty meeting those deadlines, 134 and adding peer review steps to the process is unlikely
to improve that experience. If regulatory peer review were to lengthen the decision process, it is
possible in some cases that an agency will be unable to act before it is too late, such as an
endangered species moving ever closer to extinction while the agencies engage in further process.
In the context of regulatory regimes in which decision time matters, mandatory regulatory peer
review may well cause as many or more errors of omission than of commission.135 Our survey
showed that many practitioners do in fact believe that one or more of these three major concerns
about regulatory peer review are likely to occur, as shown in Figure 5.

134
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Figure 5. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the following
statements about the potential effects of applying Regulatory Peer Review to proposed regulatory
decisions. Figures show percent of respondents in each category:
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a. It is likely substantially to slow
down agency decisionmaking processes.
b. It is likely to add substantially to the
costs of agency decisionmaking.

c. It is likely to add substantially to the
incidence of litigation over agency
decisions.
d. It is likely to lead to erosion of
agency personnel morale.

e. It is likely to deter agencies from
making the kinds of decisions that are
subject to Regulatory Peer Review.
f.
It is likely to be subject to
manipulation by agencies to serve their
interests.
g.
It is likely to be subject to
manipulation by interest groups to serve
their interests.

The results indicated no surprising differences of opinion on these issues between
government and industry attorneys. As shown in Figure 6, industry attorneys are more likely to
believe regulatory peer review will slow down agency work and be subject to manipulation,
government attorneys are more likely to believe it will add to litigation and erode agency morale;
the two groups agreed regulatory peer review would likely add to agency costs and were equally
mixed in feeling it would steer agencies away from making decisions subject to peer review.
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Figure 6: The second column shows which group, federal or state government career (Govt) or private
firm/in-house corporate career (Corp), was significantly more likely agree with the statement in the first
column (i.e., answer “strongly agree” or “somewhat agree”), based on the breakdown between the two
groups of who agreed (third and fourth column) and on the odds that a person selected randomly from the
more likely group would agree compared to a person selected randomly from the less likely group (fifth
column):
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Overall, therefore, the case against regulatory peer review, while not based on persuasive
empirical evidence, does find support in basic institutional theory and in perceptions that are
widely held among experienced practitioners of regulatory law. Hence, while the case for
regulatory peer review seems to deserve serious consideration, so too does the case for
proceeding with caution. Indeed, most of our respondents agreed that, on balance, the costs of
regulatory peer review would not significantly outweigh the benefits.136 Rather than never
136

Fifty-four percent of our survey respondents disagreed with the statement that “the likely costs (such as
slowing down agency decisions) would significantly outweigh the likely benefits (such as improving the
quality of agency data selection), whereas only 29 percent agreed and 16 percent had no opinion.
Government attorneys were almost three times more likely to agree with the statement than were industry
attorneys.

REGULATORY PEER REVIEW

34

84 WASHINGTON UNIV. L. REV. 1 (2006)

employing regulatory peer review, or employing it all the time, a balanced approach thus seems
appropriate.
Yet peer review has become a pawn in a much larger debate over the appropriate roles of
science and policy in our society. As such, its supporters and its opponents alike overstate its
advantages and disadvantages. There is little question increased use of regulatory peer review
would detect some cases of agency failure, but it could also place some drag on agency process.
After all, the Klamath Committee did confidently conclude that the federal agencies acted without
scientific foundation, but it took time and money to reach that conclusion. Most of the asserted
promises and pitfalls of regulatory peer review, however, are posited in an empirical vacuum. In
short, how much benefit or burden to expect from wholesale or strategic application of regulatory
peer review to administrative decisions is really unknown.

V.

RECONCEIVING THE ROLE OF REGULATORY PEER REVIEW

Since any discussion of regulatory peer review must operate, for now, based on theory
and perception rather than empirical evidence, it is important to think clearly about how it might
be implemented to balance the countervailing concerns, particularly given the high level of
political interest at the moment in taking action. In assessing any specific proposal, therefore,
three overarching questions about regulatory peer review in general ought to be addressed: (1)
what are its most important potential benefits; (2) where in the regulatory process should it be
applied to maximize these benefits; and (3) under what conditions would it most likely
substantially hinder or otherwise undermine agency process?
A.

Defining Potential Benefits

Most of the fog surrounding regulatory peer review arises from the proclivity of almost
everyone involved in the debate to conflate science and policy, as if agencies make one holistic
conclusion about each particular regulatory decision. After the Klamath Committee issued its
report, for example, one FWS official concluded, accurately, that the Committee “didn’t say the
science proves we were wrong; they just said there wasn’t enough science to prove us right.”137
In science, of course, that is enough—one generally does not get published in scientific journals
based on a claim that one’s research did not prove anything. Yet, the FWS official clearly took
solace in the peer review’s finding a lack of scientific support for the agency’s position rather
than finding that scientific data refuted the agency’s position.
The difference, for regulatory decisions at least, is grounded in the policy component of
administrative decision. In fact, Congress rarely commands that an agency decision be based
solely on scientific evidence conclusively proving the decision correct. In the Klamath setting,
for example, the decision FWS was required to make involved an evaluation of whether the
Bureau’s proposed water diversions would jeopardize the continued existence of the protected
fish species,138 and Congress has commanded that FWS use the “best scientific data available” to
make that decision.139 This standard’s “obvious purpose . . . is to ensure that the ESA not be
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implemented haphazardly, on the basis of speculation or surmise,”140 but that does not encompass
an agency’s well-reasoned use of professional judgment in the face of incomplete scientific
evidence. Frequently, perhaps most of the time, it will be the case that an agency must use some
basis in addition to the best scientific data available for reaching a jeopardy decision. In some
regulatory settings Congress prescribes additional policy-based factors, such as cost-benefit
analysis, that an agency must meld with its scientific analysis to reach a final regulatory decision.
In other cases, such as the ESA jeopardy analysis, it may come down simply to the agency’s
exercise of professional judgment about which way to lean when the science is not definitive in
either direction, jeopardy or nonjeopardy. Indeed, FWS and NOAA frequently have stated that
they will “err on the side of the species” in such cases. 141 This may be a perfectly appropriate
policy decision, but it is not one the agency can use science to prove itself right in particular
cases.
The problem is that agencies might not make the policy-based preferences or findings
underlying their decisions explicit in their decision justifications. In the Klamath experience, for
example, neither FWS nor NOAA presented any basis other than science for their respective
decisions. In other words, once the Klamath Committee “said there wasn’t enough science to
prove us right,” the agencies were left speechless—they had articulated no reasoned alternative
basis to justify their decisions that led directly to the termination of irrigation water. It is not
clear whether the agencies believed their scientific explanation was airtight, and thus no
professional judgment was needed, or whether they simply believed enough science was
presented that nobody would ask for additional justification. Had the Klamath Committee not
conducted its peer review, nobody would have asked, at least not in any way that would have
been likely to succeed in demonstrating the lack of scientific support for the agencies’ positions.
Hence one benefit—perhaps the chief benefit—that could reasonably be expected to
derive from the use of regulatory peer review is that it would encourage agencies to provide
sharper delineations between scientific and policy bases for decisions. Agencies should be loathe
to have science prove their decisions wrong, but should take no pride when science does not
prove their decisions right and no other supporting basis exists in the decision record. This is not
to say that science alone must ever conclusively prove an agency right in order for its decision to
be consistent with statutory expectations. Rather, it is important that agencies not overstate,
either by commission or omission, the role science plays in justifying their decisions relative to
non-scientific, policy-driven bases. In short, the public ought to know how far science takes the
agency in support of its decision, and what beyond science fills any gaps.
It is not just our survey’s potentially biased industry attorneys who believe this is an
important goal of administrative law. Another National Research Council committee of experts,
this one convened to review the scientific support for federal agency management decisions in the
Platte River Basin, explained the difficulty agencies face in integrating incomplete and
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inconclusive science into regulatory decisions that involve value judgments.142 The committee
observed that the policy aspects of such decisions
are not scientific in the sense that they could, even in theory, be decided solely through
evaluation of empirical, objectively gathered data. They require social or political value
judgments that are inevitably subjective. The committee believes that these judgments
should be made transparent; that is, [an agency] should clearly explain in a decision
document both its evaluation of the scientific data and its use on nonscientific factors to
reach a final decision. 143

Similarly, Cary Coglianese and Gary Marchant recently observed,
Embedded within any bare claim that a policy decision is “based on” science, or that
science “leads to” a particular policy choice, will be some underlying normative position.
If the core normative dimension to any policy decision is camouflaged in science, the
resulting policy outcomes, as well as any explanations or rationalizations offered in their
defense, will likely be inconsistent if not unreasonable.144

If this sharper delineation between science-based and policy-based support for decisions
is seen as a benefit in the regulatory context, one would be hard-pressed to identify a better
method for producing the effect than regulatory peer review. Indeed, even in its scientific
applications, peer review is not expected to prove any research wrong, but rather to identify flaws
and deficiencies in a particular research effort that may call into question whether the researcher’s
conclusions are justified. As yet another National Research Council committee recently
concluded, peer review when properly conducted is a critical component of the transparency and
openness desired of regulatory decisions.145 If peer reviewers are charged to identify aspects of a
regulatory decision not supported by science, they have performed this service, and it would be
left to the agency to explain what nonscientific factors went into filling the gap.146 But where in
the regulatory process can peer review best be applied so as to maximize these potential benefits?
B.

Mapping Peer Review Onto Regulation

Opponents of the “sound science” movement frequently (and accurately) point out that
the movement’s primary aim seems to be to increase the quantity rather than the quality of the
agencies’ science—i.e., to impose on agencies the duty to do science more often rather than to
use science more carefully.147 Some agencies, of course, engage in pure research, and
presumably nobody is opposed to having them undergo scientific peer review. Most regulatory
agencies, such as FWS in conducting a jeopardy evaluation, are neither expected by law nor
142
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equipped by budget to conduct the original research necessary to evaluate a decision. In the
general sense, therefore, the “sound science” movement is truly off the mark.
But peer review is simply one component of the practice of competent science, and it
imposes nothing directly in the way of requiring a researcher to do more science. It is quality
control, not quantity control. To be sure, the result of peer review may be to fault a researcher for
shortcutting some aspect of research—not enough test runs, too few data points, insufficient
control procedures, and so on—which may translate into a finding that the research design was
inadequate. But peer review does not impose arbitrary minimum quantities of procedures on
researchers.
Seen in this light, once peer review is severed from the larger “sound science” movement,
its use in regulatory contexts does not fall prey to the criticism that it is about quantity rather than
quality. Indeed, it is all about the quality of the agency’s use of science, not the quantity of the
agency’s conduct of science.
On the other hand, that is all that regulatory peer review is about—the agency’s use of
science. To the extent that an agency is candid about the relative contribution of science and
policy bases in support of a regulatory decision, therefore, regulatory peer review focuses
exclusively on the science component. Anyone who has in mind going further—that is,
subjecting the agency’s policy rationales to evaluation—is not talking about importing scientific
peer review into the regulatory process.
Defined as such, peer review actually maps onto the regulatory process in a rather
straightforward manner. Using the components of scientific peer review introduced earlier in the
article, the following model compares scientific peer review to the four stages of the use of
science in regulatory decision making: (1) the search for scientific data; (2) the selection of data
found through the search for use in the decision; (3) the interpretation of the selected data in
terms relevant to the decision; and (4) the integration of that interpretation with whatever other
factors the agency must or may consider in order to reach a final decision.
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Stage
Search

Scientific Peer Review
What was the quality of the
research design and data
collection procedures?

Selection

Were the methods for testing
the hypothesis appropriate and
robust?
To what extent are the
conclusions supported by the
analysis of the data?
Not relevant—science is the
exclusive source of the
conclusions drawn in scientific
research.

Interpretation

Integration

Regulatory Peer Review
Did
the
agency
consult
appropriate sources of data and
scientific research on the issue
for decision?
Did the agency appropriately
select data and research it
identified in the search?
Did the agency draw appropriate
scientific conclusions from the
data and research it selected?
Not
applied—although
the
agency might use other sources
to reach its regulatory decision,
regulatory peer review stops at
evaluation of the agency’s
interpretation of the selected
data and research .

To illustrate more concretely how this model operates, consider the decision FWS and
NOAA must make once they have listed a species, whether to designate “critical habitat” for the
species. Section 4(a)(3) requires the agencies, within certain time frames, and only “to the
maximum extent prudent and determinable,” to “designate any habitat of such species which is . .
. considered to be critical habitat.” 148 Section 3(5)(A)(i) defines critical habitat as “specific areas
within the geographic area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed . . . , on which are found
those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which
may require special management consideration or protection.”149 Areas outside the species’
geographic range may be designated if they are “essential for the conservation of the species.”150
These determinations must be made “on the basis of the best scientific data available.”151 In
either case, however, the agency must “tak[e] into consideration the economic impact, the impact
on national security, and any other relevant impact, of specifying a particular area as critical
habitat.”152 Taking those impacts into consideration, the agency “may exclude any area from
critical habitat if . . . the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area
as part of the critical habitat.”153 However, this impact analysis may not be used to exclude an
area if the agency “determines, based on the best scientific and commercial data available, that
the failure to designate such area as critical habitat will result in the extinction of the species
concerned.”
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This snarl of science and policy decisions can be unpacked into its discrete components
as follows.
•
•
•
•
•
•

Step One—Science: What is the geographic range of the species and which areas
within and outside that range contain biological or physical features essential to the
conservation of the species?
Step Two—Policy: Which areas identified in Step One that are within the geographic
range require special management consideration or protection?
Step Three—Policy: What are the economic and other impacts of designating areas
that are candidates for designation after conclusion of Step One and Step Two?
Step Four—Policy: Does the impact analysis from Step Three provide a basis for
excluding candidate areas from designation, on the ground that the social and
economic benefits of exclusion outweigh the benefits to the species of designation?
Step Five—Science: Would exclusion of any areas based on Step Four lead to the
extinction of the species?
Step Six—Policy: Is there any other reason why designation would not be prudent?

This is depicted graphically as a flow chart on the following page.
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Step One: What is the
geographic range of the species
and which areas within and
outside that range contain
biological or physical features
essential to the conservation of
the species?

Science

Step One: What is the
geographic range of the species
and which areas within and
outside that range contain
biological or physical features
essential to the conservation of
the species?

Step Two: Which areas
identified in Step One that are
within the geographic range
require special management
consideration or protection?

Policy

Step Two: Which areas
identified in Step One that are
within the geographic range
require special management
consideration or protection?

Step Three: What are the
economic and other impacts of
designating areas that are
candidates for designation after
conclusion of Step One and Step
Two?

Policy

Step Three: What are the
economic and other impacts of
designating areas that are
candidates for designation after
conclusion of Step One and Step
Two?

Policy

Step Four: Does the impact
analysis from Step Three provide
a basis for excluding candidate
areas from designation, on the
ground that the social and
economic benefits of exclusion
outweigh the benefits to the
species of designation?

Step Five: Would exclusion of
any areas based on Step Four lead
to the extinction of the species?

Science

Step Five: Would exclusion of
any areas based on Step Four lead
to the extinction of the species?

Step Six: Is there any other
reason why designation would not
be prudent?

Policy

Step Six: Is there any other
reason why designation would not
be prudent?

Step Four: Does the impact
analysis from Step Three provide
a basis for excluding candidate
areas from designation, on the
ground that the social and
economic benefits of exclusion
outweigh the benefits to the
species of designation?
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Regulatory peer review, as we suggest it should be constructed, would not apply to any
step designated as a policy question. Rather, only Step One and Step Five in our configuration of
the critical habitat decision tree require the agency to search for, select, and interpret scientific
data and research. Regulatory peer review applied to those two stages of the decisionmaking
process would engage in the following kinds of inquiry:

Peer Review Focus
Scope of Peer Review Inquiry
Agency’s search for data What steps did the agency take to locate available scientific data
and research
and research? Did the agency perform a literature survey of
relevant journal publications? Did the agency solicit information
from researchers with relevant expertise at universities, other
agencies, and private research sources? Was the scope of the search
appropriate—e.g., if information about the species in question is
limited, did the agency search for data and research about similar
species?
Agency’s selection of data How did the agency evaluate the quality of available data to select
and research identified in the “best available” as required by the statute? Did the agency
its search
employ appropriate methods for determining the relative quality of
the data and research sources identified in its search? Did the
agency exclude any data or research for appropriate reasons? Did
the agency rely on data or research of questionable reliability?
Agency’s interpretation of Are the agency’s conclusions about the geographic range of the
data and research selected
species, biological and physical features essential to the
conservation of the species, and the threat of extinction if specific
areas were excluded from designation all justified based on the peer
reviewer’s assessment of the data and research the agency should
have selected? Did the agency make appropriate conclusions about
what were the “maximum determinable” aspects of each of these
inquiries?

None of these questions strikes us as inconsistent with the type of inquiry conducted in
scientific peer review. Nor do they strike us as inappropriate questions to ask of an agency
purporting to base its regulatory decision in any significant part on science. These questions, if
rigorously pursued, would likely lead reviewers to detect cases in which an agency attempted to
oversell what its scientific case supports, and thus would be likely to encourage agencies to be
more careful in their search for, selection of, and interpretation of scientific data and research.
Scientific peer review, in other words, maps quite nicely onto the regulatory process to produce
regulatory peer review.
C.

Avoiding Drag

As to the concern regarding making agencies jump through more hoops, our formulation
of regulatory peer review focuses on the quality of the agency’s use of science, not the quantity of
how much science it conducts. As previously noted, achieving quality in the use of science may
require some agencies to do more work than they have in the past—conduct broader literature
searches, deliberate more over relative quality of data, spend more time analyzing the data and
research—but if an agency presents any of its work as scientific in quality, there is a minimum
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standard it must meet to do so credibly. Asking agencies to substantiate their scientific claims
ought not strike anyone as repugnant to appropriate administrative procedures, even if it does
demand more of an agency that heretofore has not been careful about doing so.
As to the concern that regulatory peer review imposes unrealistic burdens of proof, that
also is not the case under our formulation of the process. Regulatory peer review does not import
the default scientific burden of proof that the data support the conclusion within a 95 percent level
of confidence. Rather, regulatory peer review imports the standards of proof prescribed in the
relevant statutory program. In the critical habitat designation procedure, for example, regulatory
peer review would be conducted within the statutory directives that the agency consider only the
“best scientific data available” and reach conclusions based on what is the “maximum
determinable” from that body of information.
Finally, as to the concern that regulatory peer review will unduly impede and interfere
with agencies’ policy deliberations, that is the least likely effect under the formulation we
propose. The unyielding boundary of regulatory peer review stops at the line between agency
interpretation and integration—interpretation of available data and research and integration of the
agency’s scientific conclusions with other factors in the decisionmaking procedure. Indeed, if
regulatory peer review produces any improvement in the quality of agencies’ use of science,
which we believe it would, it should only improve agencies’ policy deliberations by providing
more confidence in the scientific input and more explicit delineation between what is science and
what is policy in the justification the agency presents for its final decision.
Nevertheless, we do recognize that regulatory peer review must be conducted properly if
it is to be conducted at all. Wendy Wagner and others have argued persuasively that sham
regulatory peer review may actually prove counterproductive by helping agencies overstate the
extent of support they derive from science by giving policy decisions the appearance of a
scientific exercise.154 Moreover, regulatory peer review will take time and money to conduct,
resources that may take away from other important agency goals. Both are legitimate concerns:
Peer review can be misused, just as science can be misused. Peer review costs money and, at a
certain point, can require so many resources that other agency activities are compromised. The
answer to both concerns is the same—design matters. Accordingly, in the next section we outline
a proposal for implementing regulatory peer review which we believe would yield its major
benefits without undermining its effectiveness by imposing significant resource constraints on
regulatory processes.
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A PROPOSED MODEL OF RANDOMIZED PEER REVIEW

This Article has set out the main arguments in favor of and opposed to regulatory peer
review, described the major peer review initiatives in Congress and OMB, and looked at how we
should think about peer review, all leading to three key points. First, peer review can improve
agency decisionmaking based on the use and interpretation of scientific data, but, second, how
many agency decisions actually would be improved by peer review is unknown. And this matters
because, third, the practice of peer review imposes costs. The policy question then becomes how
we can capture the benefits of regulatory peer review at lowest cost to improve overall agency
decision quality. In our view, none of the major peer review proposals provides an adequate
answer.
The ESA legislation assumes that virtually all agency decisions increasing species
protection warrant regulatory peer review. This approach is senselessly over-inclusive (imposing
peer review on all ESA protection measures would significantly weaken the statute’s ability to
conserve biodiversity) as well as under-inclusive (de-listing decisions and incidental take permits
also rely on scientific data but would not be subject to peer review). Indeed, even though most of
our survey respondents favored regulatory peer review, over two-thirds of respondents opposed
applying it to all regulatory decisions of an agency.
The OMB proposal, which became effective in December, 2004, understands that
subjecting all agency information products to peer review imposes too many costs. Thus it
mandates peer review for data that could have a substantial impact on important public policies,
for agency decisions that impose private sector impact of over $500 million impact, or for
decisions that involve precedent-setting, novel and complex approaches. A slim majority of our
survey respondents favored this approach. Nevertheless, while these thresholds do provide cutoff points, they also screen out most regulatory actions from consideration. For example, in the
ESA context, most habitat conservation plans and jeopardy consultations would be immune from
peer review. The OMB proposal either assumes that these actions would not benefit from peer
review (which seems questionable) or that it would be too expensive. It is also worth noting that
OMB’s guidelines assume that if an agency relies on peer-reviewed research, the need for peer
reviews is eliminated. This points directly into the ultimate shortcoming of the OMB
guidelines—peer review is required only for “information products,” not for how the agencies
use the “information products” in their regulatory decisions. If OMB cares about improving the
quality of regulatory decisions and not just the information products, which seems to be the case
given the threshold standards, its guidelines do so in an indirect manner.155 The net result of
focusing on information products and excluding peer-reviewed research is that the key steps of
search, selection, and interpretation set out in Section V are missed, as well. By focusing only on
the quality of the information agencies use, it is not at all clear that the OMB Guidelines will, or
can, effectively address whether the agency appropriately interpreted and applied the information.
The peer review critics’ counter-proposals are unsatisfying, as well. Groups calling for
no peer review at all either deny that any agency decisions would benefit from peer review or
claim that, in any case, the medicine will prove worse than the disease. Sid Shapiro takes a more
nuanced approach, recommending that agencies be allowed to employ ad hoc procedures for
deciding when peer review is appropriate.156 Given the self-serving experiences of FWS, NOAA,
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Given the wording of the Data Quality Act, OMB likely had no choice but to restrict its guidelines to
information products. Shapiro, supra note __, at __.
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See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note __, at __.

44

REGULATORY PEER REVIEW

84 WASHINGTON UNIV. L. REV. 1 (2006)

and OMB with peer review, however, there is little reason to be optimistic that the quality-control
benefits of peer review would endure. If these agencies’ experiences provide any guide, the
legitimacy of peer review would be undermined by agency discretion and self-interest in its
application. In his comment letter on behalf of the Center for Progressive Regulation, Shapiro
offers a different proposal, that “OMB should limit peer review to circumstances in which the
information to be disseminated sets a new precedent or is reasonably controvertible.”157 This
proposal was largely adopted in the revised OMB proposal described above, but it focuses more
on the nature of the data than the nature of the decision, which is clearly where the interest lies in
regulatory peer review.
If all of these proposals have serious shortcomings, is there a better approach? We
believe there is, but to explain why, one needs to return to first principles. In order to craft a peer
review policy, we need to be clear about what the most significant benefits of peer review are.
Debate and scholarship to date have largely focused on four types of benefits. The most obvious
is quality control. Hence the descriptions of peer review as a “second opinion” that catches
mistakes in the original decision’s use of science or as an expert filter that catches bias or theory
protection in the original decision.158 This is closely linked to the legitimizing function of peer
review. As OMB has argued, peer review can promote greater public confidence in agency use of
science. This is the reason most scientists believe that peer review is “essential to the integrity of
scientific and scholarly communication.”159 Peer review also serves a deliberative function,
providing for give and take between proponent and reviewers.160
Serious debate continues over how significant these potential benefits are, however,
because of significant uncertainty over how often agencies overstate the extent of scientific
support for their regulatory decisions. Implicit in the arguments of Representative Walden and
OMB is the assumption that agencies do so frequently enough to justify making peer review
commonplace. Otherwise their proposals would be pointless, requiring extensive reviews to
address a negligible problem. Critics of their proposals similarly argue that the problems
surrounding agencies’ use of science have been exaggerated. As noted in the Introduction,
though, it is simply not clear how many Klamaths are out there. And this ignorance forms the
basis for our proposal, for regulatory peer review offers a potential benefit that no one has talked
about—its diagnostic function. Neither advocates nor critics of regulatory peer review can
intelligently assess the merits of requiring it—whether restricted to major decisions, decisions
that create precedent, or decisions that protect species—without first having a clear sense of
whether none, a few, or many of these decisions would benefit from peer review. Yet this
critically important issue has received little consideration in the current debate.161 The greatest
benefit of peer review may lie in providing empirical data on the scope of the problem that can
then tell us whether broader or reduced use of peer review is warranted.
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To capture all the benefits outlined above, we propose a model of Randomized Peer
Review with three discrete stages:
Stage One: Target Decisions
First identify classes of regulatory decisions that would likely benefit from peer review.
This would include types of agency decisions that rely on scientific data and scientific
judgments (similar to the description of the critical habitat designation decision shown in
Part IV). Within this broad class of decisions, randomly select a subset of specific
regulatory decisions within a six-month period.162 To commence, we would suggest
following the IRS audit practice of selecting roughly 1-2% of the eligible decisions.163
Stage Two: Peer Review Decisions
The peer review of the science underpinning these decisions would be conducted by
groups of three experts selected from standing panels established by the NRC. Peer
reviewers would be compensated in order to attract competent experts and improve
timely performance, vetted for potential bias by the NRC through its standard practice,
appointed for a limited term, and kept anonymous to the decisionmaking agency except
in cases in which the reviewers’ desire to conduct field investigation and interviews
precludes anonymity.164 The peer review committees would not be asked to conduct a de
novo review of the agency’s entire record and decision. Rather, the committee would be
asked to evaluate the agency’s protocol for identifying relevant scientific data and
research, its rationale for selecting and prioritizing data and research from the identified
pool, and its interpretation of this body of science. When necessary, the peer reviewers
could request important data compilations or research reports relied upon by the agency
in making these evaluations. The peer review would be completed in no more than 90
days and would not be subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
Stage Three: Disseminate and Analyze Reviews
The results of the peer review would be released to the agency and the public prior to the
conclusion of any public notice and comment procedures applicable to the underlying
decision. After a period of two years, and every two years thereafter, the overall results
of the peer reviews conducted for a particular agency and regulatory program (e.g.,
designations of critical habitat) would be assessed to determine whether the audit rate is
appropriate and, more generally, whether the agency’s use of science warrants the
mandatory or more intensive practice of regulatory peer review.
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The OMB proposal also focuses on information that will have an important impact on public policies or
an impact of more than $500 million per year. We believe that focusing on science underpinning discrete
regulatory decisions is more appropriate because, at its core, this is really what parties on both sides of the
sound science debate care about—whether the science underpinning agency decisions accurate and
properly interpreted.
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How well does this proposal capture the benefits yet minimize the costs of regulatory
peer review? For those decisions that are reviewed, the proposal ensures quality control in
particular cases. Based on the IRS experience, the randomized aspect of the proposal is intended
to create a general deterrent effect, ensuring agency officials understand that their decision may
become subject to peer review. Through this approach, the benefits of regulatory peer review
will be more institutional in nature than identifiable in discrete cases. In other words, if the audit
rate is high enough, the prospect of peer review would inherently lead agencies to think twice
about their use of science in making decisions. Such a regulatory peer review framework
ultimately may not substantially change the outcome of many regulatory decisions, but would
beneficially influence the way in which regulatory decisions are carried out. The proposal also
helps further legitimize agency decisions, ensuring in a transparent process, independent of
agency influence, that the use of science was appropriate. It promotes the deliberative function of
peer review, furnishing an independent, expert review of an agency decision that the agency can
consider in its final determination. And, perhaps most important, it provides a way to empirically
assess whether agency use of science really should be of concern and to finally answer how many
Klamaths are out there.
But what of the downsides? As we noted earlier, paralysis by analysis is a real concern
for resource-strapped agencies working under tight deadlines. At some point, the quest for
relevant, reliable, and reviewed data may add so much time to the decisionmaking process that
the policy effectiveness of the decision is impeded. What a hollow victory it would be, for
example, to spend so much time ensuring the reliability of the data proving a species is
endangered, that the species is extinct by the time the decision to protect it is made. Adding time
and budget constraints to the picture amplifies the prospect and potential intensity of these
conflicting constraints. Optimal decisionmaking, in other words, requires that we intentionally
operate at an “optimal level of ignorance,” understanding that comprehensive peer review would
be counter-productive.165
Our proposal has its costs, to be sure, but they are significantly less than the other
proposals. If a 1-2% audit rate can serve as a meaningful general deterrent and provide an
accurate sample for analysis, the most important benefits of more comprehensive review
requirements can be satisfied at a fraction of the cost.166 Appropriating funds for the NRC rather
than the target agencies to pay for the reviews would also ensure that agencies are not forced to
sacrifice other activities in order to carry out reviews.
And what about concerns that the peer review process will become politicized or
captured? Our proposal represents a measured approach that enhances regulatory peer review,
but puts the decision to use it and how to conduct it outside of the agencies’ hands and into the
hands of a generally respected neutral player. Although many stakeholders disagreed with the
Klamath Committee’s conclusions and how the Departments of Interior and Commerce
incorporated them into policy,167 no allegations were heard that the committee somehow was
influenced by bias. The same cannot be said of peer reviews that have been carried out under the
peer review policy FWS and NOAA have used for their ESA decisions.
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Our model of Randomized Peer Review also raises a series of important administrative
law questions. The first is how the agency should use the reviews. This could range from
treating the review no differently than a comment letter from the general public to requiring an
agency response explaining why it has or has not revised its decision consistent with the peer
review results.168 In either case, the review would become part of the administrative record for
purposes of any judicial challenge. The more difficult question turns on what role the peer
review should play if the agency decision is later challenged as arbitrary and capricious. Here
again, the court’s treatment of the review could range from giving it no special status to giving it
the heightened deference accorded to views expressed by sister agencies.169
In our view, the peer review report should be treated no differently than public
submissions through the notice and comment process of informal rulemaking. Given the intense
light and heat surrounding the sound science debate, simple political expediency would likely
force the agency’s hand. It would be a cocky agency director, indeed, who simply ignored a
critical peer review finding (and likely a director who did not mind traveling up to Capital Hill to
explain to skeptical senators why the agency’s actions were contrary to the peer review).
Similarly, we see no need for the court to grant special deference to the review. In many cases
involving peer review, the agency will be making decisions in the face of scientific uncertainty.
Upsetting the tendency of courts to defer to the agency’s choice in close-call cases, when some
record evidence exists to support a decision in either direction and the statute imposes no default
position, strikes us as unwarranted.170 Fundamentally, it must be remembered, the purpose of
peer review is to improve agency decision quality, not to arm litigants or undermine agency
discretion.
V.

CONCLUSION

Agency use of peer review processes is neither new nor, until recently, particularly
controversial, yet it has not been widely used in regulatory settings. The Klamath saga, the OMB
mandate for peer review of “information products” across the federal government, and the
obvious legislative attempts to smother the regulatory arms of the ESA through peer review, have
fundamentally changed the landscape. The ensuing debate has generated inflated claims over the
use of peer review in regulatory settings as either a golden virtue or a sinister evil.
We have sought to show that regulatory peer review can meaningfully improve agency
decisions that rely on the use or interpretation of scientific information, but that this alone tells us
nothing about whether peer review should therefore become part and parcel of agency decision
processes. We believe it is unwarranted and may well prove unwise to mandate peer review
across the board for agency actions, such as the preparation of “information products” or the
promulgation of rules or decisions based on such information, without a clear understanding of
168
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the real extent of the problem peer review is supposed to address. In proposing an approach of
randomized peer review, we seek to shift the debate away from whether regulatory peer review is
good or bad, or whether agencies are biased or not, and on to a more productive, empirically
grounded vantage from which we can more intelligently assess the proper role for this process in
agency settings.

